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All Work Cultures Discriminate 
Deborah M. Weiss* 
 
Men compete with others while women care for them, and from this 
fundamental difference flows many dissimilarities in risk-taking, 
toughness, and trust.  Such generalizations have long been invoked by 
traditionalists to explain why women will inevitably be drawn to some jobs 
rather than others, and why those jobs will be lower in pay and prestige 
than jobs predominantly held by men.  This argument was famously 
advanced by the defendant in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.1: Sears suggested that women were 
inherently less interested than men in highly paid commission sales jobs 
and preferred lower paid salaried positions. 
The Sears case immediately caused a furor and has continued to be a 
focal point for debates about women and work.  Some feminists believe 
that sex differences should be acknowledged and accommodated.  They 
believe that personality traits relevant to work are differently distributed in 
the current male and female population.  However, they point out, the 
match between personality type and job is determined not only by intrinsic 
job characteristics but also by a firm’s work culture.  Work cultures are in 
part the product of employer choices, conscious or otherwise, and in any 
given industry, successful work cultures can vary greatly.  Many work 
cultures developed when the labor market was dominated by men, and 
accommodationists propose that firms be encouraged or required to create 
work environments that are more congenial to the personality traits now 
common in women.  Accommodationists include some scholars who 
 
* Senior Research Affiliate, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, 
Northwestern University School of Law, and Visiting Scholar, McCombs School of 
Business, University of Texas-Austin.  This paper has been greatly improved by the 
comments of Cary Franklin, Joseph Fishkin, Gregory Mitchell, John Monahan, J. Hoult 
Verkerke, Kimberly Yuracko, and participants in University of Virginia School of Law 
faculty workshop and the Labor and Employment Law Colloquium at Northwestern 
University School of Law and Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
 1.  The Sears litigation was complex and protracted.  The EEOC first began its internal 
investigation into Sears in 1973.  It filed suit in 1979, and in 1980 the District Court denied 
Sears’ motion to dismiss.  EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 276 (N.D. Ill. 
1980) [hereinafter Sears I].  Commentary on the case frequently examines both the opinion 
of the District Court, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) [hereinafter Sears II], the opinion 
on appeal by the Seventh Circuit, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Sears III], and 
the dissent on appeal, Sears III, 839 F.2d at 360 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
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advocate sex-specific accommodations and others who advocate facially 
sex-neutral policies adapted to female-gendered traits.  Many 
accommodationists are difference feminists2 who advance an ethic of care 
conception of sex differences, thus sharing some common ground with 
traditionalists: both agree that men tend towards competitiveness while 
women, perhaps because of their role as mothers, strive for connection with 
others through care and nurturance.  
Other feminist scholars emphasize the importance of resisting 
stereotypes.  They focus on the costs of accommodation, arguing that 
efforts to base policy on any view of long-term sex differences will 
ultimately hurt women by bolstering the traditionalist view of sex roles.  
The ethic of care model, they argue, reinforces the view that women are 
intrinsically less suited than men to resource production and the public 
sphere.  Workplace segregation, in this view, results primarily from 
discrimination that is in some sense intentional, and must be addressed 
though antidiscrimination policy, which will integrate workplaces and in 
turn solve the problem of work culture. 
In this paper I examine the large body of recent empirical evidence on 
sex difference and its sometimes surprising results.  I argue that this 
research points to a revised view of difference that reduces anti-
stereotyping concerns.  Both the ethic of care and the traditionalist models 
array the masculine and feminine along a single continuum whose ends are 
labeled “competitive” and “caring.”  They take the traits “competitive” and 
“caring” to imply a whole host of other traits such as individualism and 
motivation.  Yet human personality cannot be described on a single 
dimension, and statistical sex differences are similarly richer and more 
complex than any one-dimensional theory suggests.  The competition/care 
dichotomy does seem to describe some observed differences.  The average 
man does in fact enjoy competitive situations and is stimulated by them to 
higher performance.  But competitiveness has been inaccurately been 
equated with motivation.  The average woman is not terribly competitive 
but she is ambitious.  Women often exert greater effort and respond more 
to incentives than do men, and thus their effort is motivated not by the spur 
of competition but by self-discipline, conscientiousness, responsiveness to 
feedback, and enjoyment of the intrinsic value of a task.  
Conversely, caring for others is neither the sole province of women nor 
a perfect proxy for all prosocial values.  In comparison with the average 
man, the average woman does appear more reciprocal of kindness, more 
trustworthy and more willing to make sacrifices to avoid inequality.  
However, the average man is not wholly self-interested: Compared with the 
average woman he is more trusting and more likely to make personal 
 
 2.  “Difference feminism” is the position that unless sex differences are acknowledged, 
“being equal means being like men,” a definition of equality that will disadvantage women.  
See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, Getting Civilized, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 20–21 (1994).  
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sacrifices if those sacrifices would serve utilitarian rather than egalitarian 
goals.  
The aggregation of these specific empirical findings I will call the 
empirical difference model.  These research results are sure to be revised 
over time but are at present closer to the truth than traditionalism and the 
ethic of care model.  This relative verisimilitude is, I argue, critical to 
balancing the costs of stereotyping against the benefits of accommodation, 
a determination central to deciding the role that considerations of 
difference should play in public policy.  The empirical difference model 
tends to support some recognition of difference: It suggests that 
accommodation may provide significant benefits, and that stereotyping 
costs can be reduced by questioning traditional stereotypes and providing a 
more accurate account of sex differences.  
The precise form that accommodation should take presents a more 
difficult problem.  Sex-specific policies, even if based on accurate 
generalizations, may reinforce inaccurate views and stigmatize atypical 
individuals.  Sex-neutral policies may present a reasonable compromise 
between sex-specific policies and doing nothing, but do not obviate the 
need for an accurate picture of differences.  In order to help women, sex-
neutral accommodation policies must be gender-conscious and based on a 
view of the female traits to be accommodated.  The empirical difference 
model not only provides a more accurate view of what accommodations 
would be helpful, but indicates that these accommodations might not be as 
costly as they might seem.  By making little allowance for female 
autonomy and ambition, the ethic of care model points towards work 
cultures that would impose enormous costs on employers, especially if 
adopted in high prestige jobs.  For example, a strong version of the ethic of 
care suggests that businesses like Sears would have to all but eliminate 
commission sales.  The empirical difference model provides a more 
complex picture of women who are motivated by incentives but do not 
relish conflict.  Commission sales work is not inherently uncomfortable for 
the average woman, but the highly adversarial atmosphere that Sears 
created was. 
Unfortunately, gender-conscious but sex-neutral policies have their 
own problems.  If current sex differences were entirely cultural in origin, 
these policies would—along with encouraging women’s aspirations and 
reducing discrimination—lead to convergence in the tastes of men and 
women and the integration of now-segregated occupations.3  Current 
research, however, suggests that in the long run statistical sex differences 
are likely to show some persistence, so that workers and firms will be best 
 
 3.  Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of 
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1839 (1989) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories About Women 
and Work]. 
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served by allowing different firms to adopt different practices and attract 
employees of both sexes with a congruent personality.  Requiring all firms 
to adopt a single gender-neutral work culture may impose significant costs 
on firms and provide neither the average man nor the average woman with 
the optimal work culture.  The accommodationist program faces a 
quandary.  Sex-specific policies are strong medicine that must be sparingly 
administered to avoid reinforcing stereotypes or stigmatizing non-
conformists.  Leaving today’s workplace governance in place 
disadvantages females, because the ground rules developed when males 
were the only competitors.  Yet gender-conscious neutral policies are at 
best equally unfair to both sexes, and seem a poor long-run solution to the 
problem of work culture.  
No elegant policy design can fully address these complexities: only 
messy pragmatic compromises are possible.  The simplest step can be taken 
in cases in which employers, like Sears, raise the issue of sex differences 
when defending claims based on statistical evidence.  Plaintiffs have 
generally responded by accusing defendants of trafficking in stereotypes, 
but this approach has not generally worked well with courts and another 
response is possible.  Assertions of sameness, I argue, simply end up 
measuring women against male norms, a standard by which the average 
woman will be found wanting.  Rather than deny the existence of sex 
differences, plaintiffs might question whether statistical sex differences 
take the particular form asserted by defendants, draw a picture of a work 
environment in which the average woman would excel, and note that the 
defendant chose not to provide this.  This approach in turn requires the 
empirical difference model or something like it, since the ethic care model 
does not readily support plausible work cultures. 
A more difficult question is whether defendant’s choice not to provide 
a female-friendly environment is itself actionable.  Courts will rightly resist 
any effort to make them the arbiters of every aspect of work culture.  Such 
a role is both beyond their institutional competence and disturbingly 
authoritarian, since work culture involves social as well as business 
relations.4  Challenges to work cultures, I argue, should be considered only 
as applied to extreme behavior whose regulation can be justified on more 
general grounds.  Such claims would be better regarded as a form of 
disparate impact than as a form of disparate treatment.  
Perhaps the law should place little or no obligation on employers to 
accommodate each sex.  Voluntary employer efforts thus become critical 
and the law must not interfere with voluntary efforts to devise work 
cultures that are congenial to women.  Such experiments have been made 
more difficult by the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano 
 
 4.  Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 625 
(2005). 
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and I address how a modified affirmative action defense might permit 
desirable innovation in work cultures. 
I. WORK CULTURES 
A firm’s work culture may be defined as the incentives and values that 
control the way firm members interact with each other and with outsiders.  
An employer’s work culture includes both easily defined characteristics 
such as compensation systems and less tangible ones such as the use of 
consensus or adversary dispute as a means of reaching decisions.  People 
with different personalities function best in different work cultures, and 
each work culture will tend to attract people whose temperaments are 
congruent.  
Some means of classifying work cultures would be extremely useful in 
examining the claim that different work cultures benefit different 
personalities.  Unfortunately, culture is an elusive concept in both the study 
of society and the study of organizations.5  In the absence of a satisfactory 
theoretical framework, I will describe some informal evidence of how work 
cultures might have different effects on the average male and female 
employee. 
A. COMMISSION SALES 
1. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
Sex discrimination lawsuits can provide case studies on work culture.  
Work culture is especially relevant to cases involving the lack of interest 
doctrine, in which an employer argues that a job category contains few 
women because women find the job unappealing and choose not to apply.6  
The policy and doctrinal issues raised by the lack of interest defense will be 
discussed in more detail later.  For the moment, these cases are useful as 
 
 5.  Relatively little academic work examines the dimensions along which organizations 
are best characterized, and scholars have focused instead on what might be called systems 
issues: how cultures emerge, change and are transmitted.  This emphasis can be seen by 
examining the topics covered in the classic surveys of organizational culture.  See EDGAR H. 
SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (4th ed. 2010).  The most popular 
approaches to characterizing the content of cultures develop a typology of organizations 
based on one or two especially salient characteristics.  This approach has been rightly 
criticized as oversimplifying the many dimensions of work culture.  Id. at 157.  A more 
flexible survey approach examines a number of different dimensions, although it still tends 
to examine relatively broad constructs.  See DANIEL R. DENISON, CORPORATE CULTURE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1990).  Unfortunately, the survey approach is not yet 
sufficiently developed to provide a framework for examining what personalities thrive in 
what cultures, or to provide a basis for systematic empirical work about the prevalence of 
different work cultures. 
 6.  The lack of interest defense might in principle be relevant to any case based on 
statistical evidence, whether based on disparate impact or disparate treatment theory.  See 
infra Section V.  
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illustrations of the factual characteristics of settings in which sex 
differences in personality may be important. 
The best known and most controversial lack of interest case is the 1986 
EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.7  Sales positions at Sears were compensated 
on either a commission or a non-commission basis.  The EEOC claimed 
that between 1973 and 1980 (the “disputed period”), Sears discriminated 
against women in hiring and promotion into commission sales,8 where 
compensation was on average much higher than in non-commission sales.9  
Even many of us who regard the facts of the Sears case as troubling believe 
that the EEOC’s handling of the case was ethically deficient10 and its 
theory of liability was less than perfectly clear.  In essence, the EEOC 
argued that Sears had intentionally excluded women from commission 
positions, or alternatively that the subjectivity of its employment practices 
facilitated discrimination by individual supervisors.11  Sears responded that 
women lacked interest in commission jobs,12 and the EEOC countered that 
women were not uninterested but rather discouraged from applying.13  The 
EEOC presented evidence of work culture to prove intent, not as a 
challenge to the nature of the work culture itself.  In this Section, the EEOC 
evidence is recounted to examine the work culture in which Sears 
conducted its commission selling and how that culture compared with other 
retailers. 
Throughout the disputed period, Sears made unusually concerted 
efforts to improve the position of women in its workforce.14  Employers 
frequently employ window dressing to create the appearance of a concern 
with diversity, but Sears’ efforts went far beyond this.  In the late 1960’s 
Sears voluntarily submitted to the demanding affirmative action and 
recordkeeping requirements applicable to government contractors.15  The 
federal agencies implementing these requirements repeatedly found Sears 
to be in compliance with them and regarded Sears’ efforts as a model for 
other firms to follow.16  Sears set a long-term goal of representing women 
 
 7.  See supra note 1. 
 8.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 9.  Id. at 1289. 
 10.  Judge Cudahy, who dissented in part, stated that “the EEOC’s internal machinations 
in initiating this case deserve condemnation.”  Sears III, 839 F.2d 302, 360 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
 11.  The EEOC relied primarily on a disparate treatment theory.  Id. at 312.  It made what 
the trial court called “vague references” to disparate impact theory.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 
1279.  To the extent that the EEOC did assert a disparate impact claim, that claim was based 
on the subjectivity of Sears’ practices rather than its possible masculine bias.  Id. at 1281–
85.  Since the court found that it had waived its right to assert this theory, evidence of 
masculine job typing was relevant primarily to buttress the claim of intent.  Id. at 1285 n.7. 
 12.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1305–15. 
 13.  Id. at 1314. 
 14.  Id. at 1292–94, 1306. 
 15.  Id. at 1292. 
 16.  Id. 
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in all company jobs in proportion to their representation in the general 
workforce, and it required that managers fill one out of every two new 
commission sales positions with women or minorities.17 
Sears held local managers accountable by tying compensation to 
meeting program goals and disciplining those who made insufficient 
efforts.18  As a result, Sears managers actively attempted to persuade 
current female employees19 to accept commission selling, sometimes 
approaching every woman in the store.20  A female employee who 
expressed an interest in commission selling was given priority over male 
employees when an opening occurred, and was sometimes guaranteed her 
former position if she changed her mind after trying a commission job.21  
Despite these unusual efforts, managers had only limited success in 
attracting women to commission sales.22  Sears argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that women’s lack of interest in commission sales resulted in part 
from greater aversion to financial risk.23  Commission jobs did indeed carry 
more risk.  Non-commission salespeople were compensated on a straight 
hourly rate plus 1% commission for full time salespersons.  Each week, 
commission salespeople received a “draw” of about 70% of estimated 
commissions.24  Commissions ranged between 6% and 9%.  When 
commissions actually earned were below the weekly draw, the salesperson 
incurred a deficit that carried over to the next week, although if deficit was 
not eliminated by commissions earned in the following week the deficit 
would be cleared.  After 1977, Sears changed its commission method as 
part of its effort to attract more women.  Under the new system, the 
salesperson earned a salary plus a 3% commission.25  This change 
 
 17.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1293. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  For most of the disputed period, the initial job application form did not ask whether 
the applicant was interested in commission or non-commission sales, and some of the 
controversy surrounded whether female applicants in fact expressed a serious interest in 
commission positions.  Id. at 1291. 
 20.  Id. at 1293, 1306. 
 21.  Id. at 1306. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 1307. 
 24.  Id. at 1293–94. 
 25.  Sears III, 839 F.2d 302, 320 (7th Cir. 1988).  The summary in text omits two issues 
considered in the trial court opinion.  First, the court considers the relative reluctance of 
women to work long hours, raising at least implicitly the issue of family responsibilities.  
Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1312.  Though an important issue, work-family balance is a 
complex problem that is beyond the scope of this article. 
Second, the court’s opinion is somewhat confused by repeated mention of the fact that 
women were less knowledgeable about and interested in the product lines sold on a 
commission basis, such as hard goods and men’s clothing.  Id. at 1306.  No explanation is 
given of how lines were assigned to commission or non-commission sales.  To some extent 
higher priced items were sold on commission but this does not entirely seem to explain 
Sears’ decisions, since men’s clothing was sold on commission while women’s jewelry was 
not.  Id.  I speculate that the choice of compensation method was chosen, perhaps 
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coincided with some improvement in the level of women interested in 
commission sales.26 
Sears also argued that commission sales required personality traits that 
women were unlikely to have and behavior that women were unlikely to 
enjoy.  The central factor in commission hiring was apparently an interview 
by a manager that attempted to assess whether the candidate possessed 
desired personality traits.27  Of central importance was the candidate’s 
“aggressiveness or assertiveness, competitiveness” and “personal 
dominance.”28  Sears and the trial court acknowledged but tried to 
minimize the importance of two other factors in hiring, a written 
description of the requirements for commission selling and several 
personality tests.29  However, the general picture of Sears’ goals presented 
by these factors was quite consistent with that suggested by the interview.  
Like the managerial interview, the written description of a desirable 
commission sales candidate stressed the importance of a dominant 
personality and “drive and physical vigor.”30  High scores on the 
“vigorousness” dimension of the personality tests were considered 
desirable and the relevant questions, in addition to a clear male orientation, 
equated vigor not simply with energy or even athleticism but with 
dominance and aggression, asking “Have you ever done any hunting?” and 
“Have you played on a football team?”31  Various studies by Sears’ experts 
suggested that women currently employed at Sears lacked interest in 
commission selling because such positions involved “‘dog-eat-dog’ 
competition”32 and “cut-throat competitiveness”33 that interfered with 
“friendships at work”34 and the “social and cooperative aspects of the 
 
unconsciously, to match the sex most interested in selling the line.  I attach no nefarious 
purpose to this, but it makes the relative lack of interest of women in the commission 
product lines unsatisfactory as an explanation of why women were not in commission sales. 
 26.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1309. 
 27.  Id. at 1291. 
 28.  Id. at 1290. 
 29.  Id. at 1290–91.  Both the interview criteria and the manual suggested a few factors 
not discussed in the text.  Whether Sears (or the trial court) believed there were sex 
differences in these other characteristics is unclear.  The interview criteria included 
maturity, the ability to communicate effectively, persuasiveness, an outgoing, social or 
extraverted personality, and self-confidence.  Id. at 1290.  The manual mentioned intellect, 
maturity and “the ability to react quickly to a customer’s verbal suggestions and modify the 
approach accordingly.”  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 1290. 
 31.  Id. at 1300 n.29.  The trial court stressed that the vigor criteria was waived for the 
purpose of hiring women for commission positions, which, if true may be relevant to the 
extent that deliberate intent is alleged.  Id.  My purpose here, however, is to paint a picture 
of the personality for whom this work culture was designed, and for this purpose the 
contents of the test and manual seem relevant. 
 32.  Id. at 1307. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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workplace.”35  Sears’ hiring criteria also included a “strong desire to earn a 
substantial income”36 and its expert witnesses testified that men were more 
likely than women to be motivated by the pay of a job than by the nature of 
the job and whether they enjoyed it.37 
Another factor given weight was the applicant’s “self-confidence” and 
“resilience and the ability to deal with rejection.”38  Hiring decisions were 
based on applicant self-evaluation of their skill and experience, and 
women’s self-evaluations were lower than men’s.39  Though potential sex 
differences in these respects were not discussed in the opinion, Section III 
will argue that they play an important role in the workplace. 
2. Nordstrom 
Nordstrom, a firm whose sales force is about 70% female and whose 
top hundred managers are about half female, takes a very different 
approach to commission sales.40  The Nordstrom experience shows that 
highly successful commission sales personnel can have personalities quite 
different from those sought by Sears.  Nordstrom’s sales culture is 
described in a book written with cooperation from Nordstrom 
management.41  While Sears placed a premium on self-confidence, 
toughness, and dominance, Nordstrom looks for humility and sensitivity.  
“You need to be humble to do service,” said senior executive Erik 
Nordstrom.  “The moment you think you’re really good at it is when you’re 
not really good at it . . . [I]f you’re really sensitive to the customer, and . . . 
to the people on the frontline, you are aware of your shortcomings.”42  
Nordstrom’s approach is to “hire the smile, train the skill.”43  As current 
chairman Bruce Nordstrom put it, “We can hire nice people and teach them 
to sell . . . but we can’t hire salespeople and teach them to be nice.”44 
Sears used competition as the central mechanism for motivating its 
sales force.  A competitive environment, it believed, foreclosed cooperation 
between sales personnel, and required self-sufficient employees who 
needed no external encouragement.  In contrast, Nordstrom places great 
emphasis on “unselfish” mentoring, mutual encouragement, and 
recognizing and praising its sales force.  Its philosophy accords with that of 
Mary Kay Ash, another famously successful manager of female sales 
 
 35.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1308. 
 36.  Id. at 1290. 
 37.  Id. at 1308. 
 38.  Id. at 1290. 
 39.  Id. at 1322. 
 40.  ROBERT SPECTOR & PATRICK D. MCCARTHY, THE NORDSTROM WAY TO CUSTOMER 
SERVICE EXCELLENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTING GREAT SERVICE IN YOUR 
ORGANIZATION 100 (2005). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at xiv. 
 43.  Id. at 91. 
 44.  Id. 
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personnel, who remarked, “There are two things people want more than sex 
and money . . . recognition and praise.”45  The contrast between the 
Nordstrom and Sears culture is almost comical.  Sears motivated 
employees by “dog-eat-dog competition,” while Nordstrom managers 
inspire employees “by creating an emotional bond with their fellow 
employees through a potent blend of praise, recognition, and joy.  And 
sometimes even tears.”46  
Yet for all this warmth and fuzziness, Nordstrom is a very demanding 
place to work, and supporters of the Nordstrom way refer to its work 
culture as “a process of natural selection—a survival of the fittest that is 
purely Darwinian.”47  The entire sales force is on commission and the 
typical commission rate is 6.75%,48 within the range of initial Sears’ 
commissions and above the 3% rate towards the end of the disputed period.  
Salespeople are encouraged to set high personal goals for themselves and 
data on the sales of other workers are public.49  Nordstrom has been so 
successful at motivating its workers that many work long hours off the 
clock, writing thank you notes and delivering merchandise to especially 
valued customers.50 
B. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ABUSE 
Problematic work cultures often do not result in readily identifiable 
employment decisions, and are thus prohibited, if at all, under hostile 
environment doctrine.51  Discussions of hostile environments often focus 
specifically on sexual behavior, one of the few issues for which the 
implication of sex differences for employment discrimination has received 
detailed consideration.  Sexual behavior is not the focus of this article; 
Vicki Schultz has argued hostile environments of a nonsexual nature have 
received insufficient attention52 and it is these situations that this section 
examines. 
Many courts have emphasized that Title VII does not prohibit abusive 
environments so long as the abuse is meted out on an equal opportunity 
basis.53  The conduct in these cases is sometimes quite serious, as 
 
 45.  SPECTOR & MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 171. 
 46.  Id. at 173.  
 47.  Id. at 93. 
 48.  Id. at 116. 
 49.  Id. at 178–79. 
 50.  Id. at 103–05. 
 51.  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–67 (1986). 
 52.  Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2172–90 (2002); Vicki 
Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 417 (2000); Vicki Schultz, 
Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What We 
Can Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
 53.  See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“Accordingly, we must evaluate Gross’ claim of gender discrimination in the context of a 
blue collar environment where crude language is commonly used by male and female 
employees.  Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty 
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illustrated by the 2005 district court opinion in Flowers v. Honigman Miller 
Schwarz & Cohn, LLP.  The plaintiff charged that attorney Joseph Polito 
had treated her in a degrading and abusive manner and provided supporting 
testimony from other female employees.54  One woman recounted that 
Polito had “physically grabb[ed] her” and had “chas[ed] her on the 
freeway,”55 while a second woman testified that Polito would throw objects 
at her and physically hit her.  A third reported that Polito would call her a 
“worthless piece of shit,” and further testified that Polito would “pluck her 
in the back of her head with his finger hard enough to make a thumping 
sound.”56  The court denied relief on the grounds that Polito’s treatment of 
male employees was equally abusive, but did not provide much factual 
detail, and it is hard for a reader to evaluate this conclusion. 
Academic discussions of such degrading conduct sometimes suggest 
that bullying is primarily a mechanism for enforcing gender norms and that 
its targets are generally women and feminine men.57  This conclusion is 
inadvertently reinforced by the relatively brief discussion in cases like 
Flowers of the treatment by abusers of employees outside the protected 
class.  Abuse can surely police gender norms.  Yet such conduct is also 
extremely common among heterosexual men.  Men in male-dominated 
environments often develop hazing rites that range from relentless teasing 
and horseplay to abuse.  A classic description of such rituals can be found 
in Liar’s Poker, Michael Lewis’s memoir of Salomon Brothers during the 
high flying 1980s.58  Lewis describes the experience and behavior of his 
class of trainees: 
The back row, from about the third day of class on, teetered on the 
brink of chaos.  Even when they felt merely ambivalent about a 
speaker back-row people slept or chucked paper wads at the wimps 
in the front row.  But if the back-row people for some reason didn’t 
 
meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.”); Sauers v. 
Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In its findings of fact, the district 
court concluded that ‘the work environment at the Investigative Division of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney Office was that of an unusually rough, sexually explicit and raw 
atmosphere.’”); Reine v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 362 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(unpublished), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 140 (2010); Wolff v. Northrop Grumman, 111 F. 
App’x 152, 153 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Flowers v. Honigman Miller Schwarz & 
Cohn, LLP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062 (E.D. Mich. 2005).  Of course, plaintiffs may 
prevail if the behavior directed toward protected class members was more severe.  Baker v. 
John Morrell & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152–55 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 54.  Flowers, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *2–3.  
 55.  Id. at *4.  The sexually charged harassment has been edited out to emphasize non-
sexual abuse. 
 56.  Id. at *14.  Again, the text omits sexually charged harassment. 
 57.  See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and 
Harassment Because of Sex, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151 (2008). 
 58.  See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL 
STREET (1989). 
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care for a speaker, all hell broke loose.59 . . . [One day] a back row 
person had beaned with a paper wad a managing director from 
bond market research, who had turned the color of raspberry sorbet 
and screamed for five minutes.60   
The story is striking in part because the perpetrators were trainees abusing 
their trainer, and thus were hardly exploiting a position of authority.   
Lewis elaborates on the psychology of work environment.  The back-
row people, he suggests, “were victims of the myth, especially popular at 
Salomon Brothers, that a trader is a savage, and a great trader a great 
savage.”61  Many of their superiors lived by this myth: “[l]ife as a Salomon 
trainee was like being beaten up every day by the neighborhood bully.”62  
After class, the trainees moved from class to the trading floor, “a minefield  
of large men with short fuses just waiting to explode if you so much as 
breathed in their direction.”63  One day Lewis stepped on one of these 
mines: 
Me: Hello. 
Trader: What fucking rock did you crawl out from under?  Hey, 
Joe, hey Bob, check out this guy’s suspenders. 
Me (reddening): I just wanted to ask you a couple of questions. 
Joe: Who the fuck does he think he is?64 
The resulting humiliation of Lewis and other trainees was precisely the 
point of these interchanges.  Still, subordinates were humiliated for a 
variety of different reasons.  Lewis expresses respect for the harsh Socratic 
method, which could motivate hard work, but asks what purpose could be 
served by a “trader who threw a phone at your head every other time you 
passed his desk?”65 
A common pastime was practical jokes, some of which were actually 
funny.  One poor trader named Matty stole some food from the Salomon 
cafeteria and made the mistake of bragging about it.66  The next afternoon 
he received a phone call from a man who claimed to be a Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) investigator whose jurisdiction included 
Wall Street cafeterias.  He was calling, he said, to investigate a theft of 
food from the Salomon cafeteria.  Matty laughed it off, but the next 
morning was confronted by a partner who claimed that he too had been 
 
 59.  LEWIS, supra note 58, at 40. 
 60.  Id. at 55. 
 61.  Id. at 41. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 50. 
 64.  Id. at 50–51. 
 65.  Id. at 73. 
 66.  Id. at 80–83. 
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contacted by the SEC about Matty’s food theft and was quite concerned.  
He concluded by saying that he really did not know what would happen 
next and would get back to Matty.  The next morning, Matty, already in a 
highly agitated state, was called into the offices of John Gutfreund himself, 
who expounded on the seriousness of cheeseburger larceny.  Gutfreund 
informed him that after a “long and painful meeting” the executive 
committee had decided to let him stay “for now.”  Matty exited 
Gutfreund’s office and sat at his desk, assuming his career was ruined.  
After a short time, other traders began to laugh hysterically, driving Matty 
out of the building with plans never to return.  Of such incidents Lewis 
comments, this “cruelty . . . wasn’t personal but ceremonial.  Goofs were a 
rite of initiation.”67  There are indeed times when abusive behavior is 
deliberately targeted towards women because they are women, but 
sometimes abuse is simply an aspect of intra-male culture.  
Regrettably, no female-dominated financial institution exists to serve 
as a comparitor for Salomon as Nordstrom was for Sears, but the contrast 
between Nordstrom and Sears suggests that a female-oriented financial 
firm would not have a culture of hazing.  Wall Street has proven to be one 
of the most difficult arenas for women to enter, and high profile suits 
against Wall Street firms are common; discomfort with hazing may well 
play a role in this.68 
II. SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY TRAITS 
Sears argued that commission sales required personality traits that were 
relatively uncommon among women.  Both its personnel policies and its 
defense of this claim were premised on the idea that a number of diverse 
traits are highly correlated.  In its view, a successful salesperson needs not 
only financial motivation but aggressiveness, assertiveness, 
competitiveness, self-confidence, and personal dominance.  In aggregating 
these traits, Sears’ position tracked traditionalist views as well as a 
considerable body of difference feminist literature, and indeed a prominent 
feminist testified in support of Sears.69 
The extensive use of commissions at Nordstrom suggests that these 
traits cannot be as strongly associated as Sears claimed.  Still, the 
differences between female-dominated Nordstrom and male-dominated 
Sears and Salomon suggest that some more complex set of sex differences 
 
 67.  LEWIS, supra note 58, at 80–83. 
 68.  LOUISE MARIE ROTH, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: GENDER AND MONEY ON WALL 
STREET 72–74 (2008). 
 69.  The expert, Professor Rosalind Rosenberg, was the object of intense criticism by 
other feminists for her testimony, yet the views she expressed were an accurate depiction of 
a large body of difference feminist literature.  Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, 
Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1629, 1649–56 (1987). 
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may draw men and women to varying work cultures.  This Section attempts 
to put that hypothesis on firmer ground by examining several bodies of 
research that suggest some correlations between personality and sex.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
Any study of sex differences in personality inherits general problems in 
the study of personality.  Social scientists from many different disciplines 
study personality, and the terminology is not standard either across 
disciplines or among sub-fields within disciplines.  The result is both the 
jangle fallacy, in which equivalent concepts are not recognized as such,70 
and the jingle fallacy, in which a single term is sometimes used to refer to 
different phenomena.71 
This Section will adopt the taxonomy that has recently developed 
among experimental economists, which has had great success in resolving 
the apparently inconsistent results of earlier studies.  At the same time, 
work in other disciplines such as personality psychology has made great 
contributions to our understanding72 and will be discussed with the basic 
analytic framework of experimental economics. 
 
 70.  EDWARD L. THORNDIKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MENTAL AND SOCIAL 
MEASUREMENTS 10 (1904); Jack Block, A Contrarian View of the Five-Factor Approach to 
Personality Description, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 209 (1995) [hereinafter Block, 
Contrarian View]. 
 71.  T.L. KELLEY, INTERPRETATION OF EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENTS 64 (1927); Block, 
Contrarian View, supra note 70. 
 72.  While economists tend to focus on beliefs and behaviors, psychologists usually 
examine traits.  Personality traits are “enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and 
thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and 
personal contexts.”  AMER. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 826 (4th ed. 2000).  Traits are not themselves behaviors but are 
believed to predict behavior.  The most commonly used framework for analyzing traits is 
the Big Five factor classification.  Several separate research groups using slightly different 
methods arrived at five similar but not identical factors that can be further broken down into 
subclasses usually called facets.  OLIVER P. JOHN & SANJAY SRIVASTAVA, The Big-Five Trait 
Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Theoretical Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF 
PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 102–11 (Oliver P. John and Lawrence A. Pervin, 
eds., 2nd ed. 1999); Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Robert R. McCrae, The Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory (NEO-PI-R), in [2 PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT AND TESTING] THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT 179 (Gregory J. Boyle et al., eds., 
2008); John M. Digman, Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model, 41 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990).  Although the Big Five has proven useful in a wide variety 
of settings, it has drawbacks.  The terminology for both factors and facets is not consistent 
among different versions of the Big Five and researchers disagree about how many traits lie 
outside the Big Five.  Sampo V. Paunonen & Douglas N. Jackson, What Is Beyond the Big 
Five? Plenty!, 68 J. PERSONALITY 821 (2000); Kibeom Lee & Michael C. Ashton, 
Psychometric Properties of the HEXACO Personality Inventory, 39 MULTIVARIATE 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 329, 331 (2004); Kibeom Lee et al., Personality Traits Beyond the 
Big Five: Are They Within the HEXACO Space?, 73 J. PERSONALITY 1437 (2005).  
Researchers also disagree about whether the data supports five factors rather than some 
other number.  Jack Block, Millennial Contrarianism: The Five-Factor Approach to 
Personality Description 5 Years Later, 35 J. RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 98 (2001).  Some of 
the most contested issues involve traits that are critical in analyzing sex differences, such as 
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The experimental economics literature adopts the standard economic 
distinction between preferences and opportunities, and draws on the 
behavioral economics literature that considers limitations on rationality.  
Preferences are divided into social preferences, which concern other 
people, and self-regarding preferences, which concern our goals for 
ourselves.  An important contribution of the new experimental work has 
been to bring some order into the previously confusing taxonomy of social 
preferences, to which we now turn. 
B. SOCIAL CHOICES 
1. Social Preferences 
When an individual’s well-being depends on the well-being of others, 
that individual is said to exhibit a social or other-regarding preference.  
Most of the debate over sex differences in personality concerns social 
preferences.73  Both traditionalists and difference feminists often suggest 
that men focus on competing with others, while women focus on caring for 
them. 
The new literature on social preferences distinguishes between 
preferences that are conditional and those that are unconditional.74  
Distributive preferences such as altruism and inequality aversion are 
independent of the actions of other people, or unconditional.75  In contrast, 
a conditional social preference depends on the actual or anticipated actions 
 
“impulsiveness.”  JOHN & SRIVASTAVA, supra, at 122.  The factor “extraversion” is 
generally defined to include sociability, assertiveness, positive emotions and warmth.  
Aggregate sex differences in this category are probably not meaningful since its factors have 
strongly opposing gender effects.  Women score higher in warmth, sociability, and positive 
emotions while men score higher in assertiveness.  Paul T. Costa, Jr. et al., Gender 
Differences in Personality Traits Across Cultures: Robust and Surprising Findings, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 326 (2001) [hereinafter Costa, Jr. et al., Gender 
Differences].  Trait analysis no doubt has important contributions to make to the 
understanding of sex differences, but those contributions must either be grounded on facet 
level analysis, not usually the practice now, or some more satisfactory factor level 
classification. 
 73.  For excellent surveys, see Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in 
Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 448 (2009); CATHERINE C. ECKEL & PHILIP J. 
GROSSMAN, Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 510 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter ECKEL & GROSSMAN, Experimental Evidence]. 
 74.  In most of the well-known games usually used in laboratory experiments, an 
individual behavior depends on more than one of these traits.  The multiplicity of traits at 
work, in combination with nonstandardized terminology, make interpretation and cross-
experimental comparison difficult at best.  However, one test, the dictator game, is relatively 
simple and depends only on unconditional preferences.  By administering to each subject 
both the dictator game and a more complex game, the researcher can draw inferences about 
individual traits that would be obscured in the more complex games separately.  James C. 
Cox, How To Identify Trust and Reciprocity, 46 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 260 (2004).  The 
details of these inferences are described infra notes 80 and 83. 
 75.  Id. at 262–63. 
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of others.76  The most important of the conditional social preferences are 
trust, trustworthiness, and retributiveness.  
For many years, studies of sex differences in distributive preferences 
found apparently inconsistent results, with women sometimes giving more 
and men sometimes giving more.  These inconsistencies seem to be 
explained by a pattern reported by Andreoni and Vesterlund.77  Women are 
more inequality-averse than men, even at a large personal cost or when 
equality decreases the size of the social pie.78  Men are more utilitarian.  If 
giving a small amount will greatly benefit the other party, so that altruism 
is inexpensive, men tend to give more than women.79 
Studies of conditional preferences also produced results that initially 
seemed inconsistent with each other, but which now have been explained 
by improved classifications and experimental methods.  If my kind actions 
are driven by the assumption that you will treat me well in return, I am 
trusting.80  In general, men are more trusting than women, although the 
 
 76.  Cox, supra note 75, at 262–63. 
 77.  James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, Which Is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in 
Altruism, 116 Q.J. ECON. 293 (2001).  Andreoni and Vesterlund used the dictator game, in 
which the proposer is given an amount of money to divide between himself and the recipient 
and the recipient must accept the offer.  The game thus examines the distributive 
preferences of the proposer.  A purely self-interested proposer would allocate nothing to the 
recipient.  In fact, many proposers do allocate some money to the recipient.  Proposer 
decisions can be caused by inequality aversion or altruism, but not by conditional 
preferences.  Id. at 295–96. 
 78.  Id. at 303. 
 79.  Id.  This result is consistent with earlier studies showing women more generous at 
the price predicted by Andreoni and Vesterlund.  Id. at 304–05 (citing Catherine C. Eckel & 
Philip J. Grossman, Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator 
Experiments, 108 ECON. J. 726 (1998)).  Women and men also respond differently to 
variations in the basic dictator game.  Women are more inequality averse and men more 
utilitarian when they allocate resources between other players.  David L. Dickinson & Jill 
Tiefenthaler, What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence, 69 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 414, 423 (2002).  
Women give less weight than men to whether resources are “earned,” id. at 424, and women 
are more likely to insure other people against losses.  Reinhard Selten & Axel Ocekenfels, 
An Experimental Solidarity Game, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 517, 529 (1998).  However, 
some circumstances reduce sex differences: these differences are lower in face-to-face 
rather than anonymous situations.  Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok, An Experimental Test for 
Gender Differences in Beneficent Behavior, 48 ECON. LETTERS 287 (1995) (imperfect 
anonymity, no sex difference in giving); Martin Dufwenberg & Astri Muren, Generosity, 
Anonymity, Gender, 61 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 42, 45 (2006) (almost no anonymity, no 
sex difference in aggregate donations though more women give something). 
 80.  Cox, supra note 74, at 263.  In trust games, player one chooses how much of his 
endowment to allocate to player two.  The amount sent is multiplied by some fixed number 
and received by player two.  Player two then decides how much money to return to player 
one.  The amount sent by player one is determined by a combination of altruism, inequality 
aversion, trust, and fear of negative reciprocity.  The amount returned is determined by a 
combination of positive reciprocity and altruism.  An experiment that combines a trust game 
with dictator games (which depend only on altruism and inequality aversion) allows 
estimation of  player one's degree of trust and player two's positive reciprocity.  Id. at 262–
63.  The differences in the individual’s behavior as dictator and trust-proposer provide a 
measure of trust, while the difference between behavior as dictator and trust-respondent 
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differences vary with circumstances and diminish as more information 
about the other party is made available.81  If I repay kind actions with my 
own kindness, I am trustworthy, or positively reciprocal.82  If I respond to 
unkind actions with more unkind actions, I am retributive or negatively 
reciprocal.83  Women appear to be more reciprocal than men: they are 
usually more trustworthy, rewarding generosity more than men do, and 
they are also more negatively reciprocal, punishing stinginess more.84  
However, the degree of women’s reciprocity seems to vary more with 
context than does that of men.  One study found that women’s positive 
reciprocity falls with the price of reciprocity and with their social distance 
from the recipient, and at high levels of social distance and price men are 
more generous.85 
2. Competition 
A situation is said to be competitive if it is zero-sum, so that an 
outcome that is beneficial to one participant is detrimental to others.86  An 
individual may enter a competitive situation to advance goals such as 
financial gain that could be satisfied in ways other than engaging in 
competition.  Although a clear terminology has not fully developed, I will 
 
provides a measure of positive reciprocity.  James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, On the Nature 
of Reciprocal Motives, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 623, 623,  625, 629–30 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & 
Deck, Reciprocal Motives]. 
 81.  Croson & Gneezy, supra note 73, at 458–60. 
 82.  Cox & Deck, Reciprocal Motives, supra note 80, at 623.  For experimental methods 
that estimate positive reciprocity, see supra note 80. 
 83.  In an ultimatum game the proposer suggests an allocation of a given sum of money.  
The responder may accept the allocation, or reject the offer, leaving each party with zero.  
The amount sent results from inequality-aversion, altruism, or fear of negative reciprocity.  
Second movers may veto such proposals because of inequality-aversion or because of 
negative reciprocity.  By combining ultimatum games with dictator games, which depend 
only on altruism and inequality aversion, the second movers’ degree of negative reciprocity 
can be estimated.  Cox & Deck, Reciprocal Motives, supra note 80, at 623. 
 84.  Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender 
Differences in a Punishment Game, 30 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 143, 151–54 (1996).  See 
generally Croson & Gneezy, supra note 73, at 460–61 (surveying literature).  One study 
distinguished between specific reciprocity, in which a subject rewards a particular individual 
who acted generously towards the subject, and general reciprocity, in which subjects 
respond to generous treatment by generosity towards third parties.  Avner Ben-Ner et al., 
Reciprocity in a Two-Part Dictator Game, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 333, 350 (2004).  
Specific reciprocity is associated with the personality traits agreeableness and neuroticism, 
which are more common in women, David P. Schmitt et al., Why Can’t a Man Be More Like 
a Woman? Sex Differences in Big Five Personality Traits Across 55 Cultures, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 168, 172 (2008), but no gender effects after controlling for 
these traits.  Ben-Ner et al., supra, at 349.  Women show more general reciprocity even after 
controlling for personality traits.  Id. at 349–50.    
 85.  James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, When Are Women More Generous than Men?, 44 
ECON. INQUIRY 587, 595–96 (2006). 
 86.  See, e.g., MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 21 
(1994). 
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reserve the term “competitiveness” to refer to the enjoyment derived from 
participation in competitive situations wholly apart from any gain obtained. 
Two important sex differences emerge with respect to competition.  
First, competitive settings generally increase the performance of males but 
not of females.87  This conclusion is somewhat sensitive to environmental 
conditions.  Second, men are far more likely than women to choose to 
engage in competition.  One study examined a task chosen so that males 
and females performed on average equally under a noncompetitive piece 
rate scheme.88  All subjects participated in a piece rate task and then in a 
tournament, in each case receiving only information on their absolute rather 
than their relative performance.  Participants were then allowed to select 
whether to repeat the task in the piece rate setting or in the competitive 
tournament setting.  While 73% of the men selected the tournament, only 
35% of the women made this choice.89  At least some members of each sex 
made choices that seem suboptimal from a strictly financial point of view.  
High ability women who performed well in the initial rounds chose a piece 
rate scheme when they would have done better in a tournament, and low 
ability men chose the tournament even when they would have done better 
under the piece rate.90  Risk and feedback aversion explained only a small 
part of this difference, which appears to be caused by male overconfidence 
and greater preference for competition.91  In other words, the males 
appeared to enjoy the competition itself, regardless of its financial rewards, 
while the females conversely disliked the competition even when they 
would have done well. 
3. Aggression  
Aggression is often defined as an act that harms others.92  The harm 
can be gratuitous or it can be instrumental.93  Ideally the study of 
aggression would be integrated into the conceptual framework used in the 
preceding sections, but at the moment it constitutes an entirely separate 
body of research.  The studies of social preferences just described were 
conducted in the laboratory by psychologists and economists, but ethical 
considerations limit the experimental study of aggression.  Aggression 
research thus often consists of field studies conducted by researchers in 
 
 87.  Uri Gneezy et al., Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 1049 (2003); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Gender and Competition at a 
Young Age, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 377 (2004). 
 88.  Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do 
Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1067, 1078, 1097 (2007). 
 89.  Id. at 1069. 
 90.  Id. at 1069–70. 
 91.  Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 88.  
 92.  John Archer & Sarah M. Coyne, An Integrated Review of Indirect, Relational, and 
Social Aggression, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 212, 212 (2005). 
 93.  Seymour Feshbach, The Function of Aggression and the Regulation of Aggressive 
Drive, 71 PSYCHOL. REV. 257 (1964). 
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ethology, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology.  Despite 
the complications of comparing this work with lab studies, aggression is of 
tremendous importance to work culture, and so I summarize aggression 
research without attempting to make it fully commensurate with 
experimental work.  
Aggression can be direct or indirect.  Direct aggression can be either 
physical or verbal, but must involve an open confrontation with the 
intended victim.  “Indirect” aggression is covert and is generally a 
“relational” or “social” attempt to ostracize the intended victim.94  Research 
uniformly shows that physical aggression is dramatically more common 
among males than females, with the difference varying across age groups 
and peaking in late teens to early twenties.95  This pattern shows strong 
cross-cultural consistency.  Some studies show no difference in toddlers but 
the trend in recent research indicates a small difference at very young 
ages.96  Direct verbal aggression is also more common among males than 
females, though the gap is smaller than for physical aggression,97 and no 
strong age patterns have emerged.  Indirect aggression displays a complex 
pattern that varies with the context and type of measurement.  Sex 
differences appear to change with age, and females seem to use more 
indirect aggression than males in later childhood and adolescence.98  
Several factors seem to contribute to the greater aggressiveness of males.  
Both sexes experience approximately equal frequency and intensity of 
anger.99  However, women may have a greater ability to control aggressive 
impulses.100  In addition, men and women assess differently the costs and 
benefits of aggression.  For all forms of aggression, provocation increases 
female aggression and sharply reduces sex differences,101 possibly because 
the other party is already antagonistic, lowering female assessment of the 
costs of aggression.  Women show markedly more aggression in 
experimental than field studies, possibly because of the greater retaliation 
 
 94.  Archer & Coyne, supra note 92, at 225–26 (indirect, social, and relational all 
measure essentially same phenomenon). 
 95.  John Archer, Sex Differences in Aggression in Real-World Settings: A Meta-Analytic 
Review, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 291, 310–11 (2004); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, 
Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male Syndrome, 6 ETHOLOGY & 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 59 (1985). 
 96.  Archer, supra note 95, at 310–11. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Nicole H. Hess & Edward H. Hagen, Sex Differences in Indirect Aggression 
Psychological Evidence from Young Adults, 27 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (2006).  
See generally Archer, supra note 95, at 308–09.  
 99.  Archer, supra note 95, at 308–09. 
 100.  Daniel Strüber, Sex, Aggression and Impulse Control: An Integrative Account, 14 
NEUROCASE 1 (2008).  
 101.  B. Ann Bettencourt & N. Miller, Gender Differences in Aggression as a Function of 
Provocation: A Meta-analysis, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 422 (1996). 
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costs in real world situations.102  Female preference for indirect aggression 
may result from the perceived lower likelihood of retaliation.103  
C. SELF-REGARDING PREFERENCES 
Self-regarding preferences are those than concern an individual’s well-
being apart from any interest taken in the welfare of others.  This Section 
examines recent studies that suggest some statistical sex differences in 
these self-regarding preferences. 
1. Risk Preferences 
Studies by psychologists and sociologists examine a wide range of 
risky behaviors, from smoking to intellectual risk.  These studies suggest 
that men are more risk-taking than women, although the degree of 
difference is somewhat task and context dependent.104 
Sex differences in risk-taking are partly explained by differences in risk 
perception.  Studies differ about the extent to which different risk 
preferences are observed after taking perception into account.  Women 
appear to be more risk-averse than men in abstract gambles with clearly 
stipulated stakes, in which differences in risk perception should in theory 
be irrelevant.105  In contextual studies where subjects must assess risk, the 
results are more mixed.  They suggest that sex differences in risk aversion 
vary with context, but account for a smaller proportion of differences in 
risk-taking than differences in risk assessment.106 
A final component of risk-taking behavior is the taste for risk, 
analogous to the taste for competition.107  In the traditional economic 
model, rational agents do not enjoy either competitive or risky situations as 
such, but are willing to enter them to gain the rewards they may bring.  
However, just as some people enjoy the experience of competition, some 
enjoy the experience of taking risks, a trait sometimes referred to as 
“sensation seeking.”108  Evidence shows that males are on average 
significantly more sensation-seeking than females, a difference which may 
explain a considerable part of greater real world risk-taking by males.109 
 
 102.  Bettencourt and Miller, supra note 101, at 443. 
 103.  Archer & Coyne, supra note 92, at 220. 
 104.  James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk-Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 377 (1999). 
 105. ECKEL & GROSSMAN, Experimental Evidence, supra note 73. 
 106.  E.U. Weber et al., A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk 
Perceptions and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 282 (2002). 
 107.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 108.  C.P. Cross et al., Sex Differences in Impulsivity: A Meta-Analysis, 137 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 97, 98 (2011). 
 109.  Id. at 98, 122. 
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2. Delay of Gratification 
“Conscientiousness” is a tendency to plan, show self-discipline, control 
impulses, and aim for achievement.  Studies that examine broad measures 
of conscientiousness sometimes, but not always, show somewhat higher 
levels of conscientiousness in women.110 
Studies using more finely differentiated categories tend to find a female 
advantage.  One meta-analysis of studies of children found girls stronger in 
several measures of “effortful control,” the ability to manage and regulate 
attention and inhibit their impulses,111 though studies of adults indicate that 
sex difference may diminish with age.112  Another study found a large 
female edge in self-discipline,113 and there is some evidence that females 
are motivated more by intrinsic enjoyment and less by external rewards 
than are males.114 
Individual studies of delay of gratification seemed to produce a mixed 
picture, though a meta-analysis suggested that women have a small but 
highly significant advantage.115  One study with over two hundred 
participants found that many of the males and not a single woman made 
time-inconsistent decisions.116  This result may explain the confusing 
results of earlier studies, since time inconsistency implies that the relative 
patience of men and women depends on the time horizon under study. 
 
 110. Schmitt et al., supra note 84.  No significant difference was found in Costa, Jr. et al., 
Gender Differences, supra note 72 (new data using NEO-PR-I).  See also Alan Feingold, 
Gender Differences in Personality: A Meta-Analysis, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 429, 442 (1994) 
(meta-analysis of studies from a wide variety of frameworks, showing no sex differences in 
the broadly-defined category of “impulsiveness,” which aggregated all traits labeled 
impulsiveness, self-control, restraint and cautiousness); Cross et al., supra note 108, at 119 
(small difference in aggregate measures). 
 111.  Nicole M. Else-Quest et al., Gender Differences in Temperament: A Meta-Analysis, 
132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 33, 60–61 (2006). 
 112.  One meta-analysis of adults found a small female advantage in “effortful control” in 
emotionally charged situations but no sex difference in “executive function.”  Cross et al., 
supra note 108, at 119–22. 
 113.  Angela Lee Duckworth & Martin E.P. Seligman, Self-Discipline Gives Girls the 
Edge: Gender in Self-Discipline, Grades, and Achievement Test Scores, 98 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 198 (2006). 
 114.  Catherine F. Ratelle et al., Autonomous, Controlled, and Amotivated Types of 
Academic Motivation: A Person-Oriented Analysis, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 734, 737 (2007); 
Katrin Bätz et al., Differences Between Boys and Girls in Extracurricular Learning Settings, 
5 INT’L J. ENVTL. & SCI. EDUC. 14  (2010). 
 115.  Irwin W. Silverman, Gender Differences in Delay of Gratification: A Meta-Analysis, 
49 SEX ROLES 451 (2003). 
 116.  Jeffrey Prince & Daniel L. Shawhan, Is Time Inconsistency Primarily a Male 
Problem?, APP. ECON. LETTERS 501 (2011). 
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D. COGNITIVE DIFFERENCES 
1. Self-Evaluation 
On average, men are substantially more self-confident than women.117  
This finding of course raises the question of the accuracy of each group’s 
self-perception.  Most research suggests that both men and women tend to 
be overconfident118 but men more so.119  Overconfidence may take a 
number of forms that show little correlation,120 but men exceed women on 
all.  Men are more likely to overestimate their own accuracy in comparison 
to true values (miscalibrate); to overestimate their own accuracy relative to 
that of other people (the better-than-average effect); and to believe they 
exercise more control over events than they do (illusion of control).121  
These findings are especially pronounced in masculine-typed tasks.122 
Women and men are equally likely to change their self-evaluation in 
response to unambiguous feedback.  Women are more likely than men to 
change their self-evaluation in response to ambiguous or noisy feedback, 
regardless of whether the feedback is positive or negative, and show 
symmetric responses to positive or negative feedback.  Men’s self-
evaluation responds positively to positive feedback and little or even 
positively to negative feedback.123 
A related phenomenon is self-handicapping, the creation or claiming of 
obstacles to successful performance in order to blame subsequent failure on 
the handicap.  Claimed self-handicapping shows no sex differences.  
 
 117.  A survey of the literature can be found in Mary A. Lundeberg & Paul W. Fox, 
Highly Confident but Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments, 
86 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 114 (1994). 
 118.  However, on very difficult tasks both sexes believe that they perform worse than 
they actually do.  Don A. Moore & Deborah A. Small, Error and Bias in Comparative 
Judgment: On Being Both Better and Worse than We Think We Are, 92 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 972, 972 (2007). 
 119.  Sylvia Beyer & Edward M. Bowden, Gender Differences in Self-Perceptions: 
Convergent Evidence from Three Measures of Accuracy and Bias, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 157 (1997) [hereinafter Beyer & Bowden, Gender Differences in Self-
Perceptions]; Sylvia Beyer, Gender Differences in the Accuracy of Self-Evaluations of 
Performance, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 960, 966 (1990) [hereinafter Beyer, 
Accuracy of Self-Evaluations]. 
 120.  Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 32 GENEVA 
RISK & INS. REV. 1, 29–31 (2007). 
 121.  Lundeberg & Fox, supra note 117; S. Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Subjective 
Probabilities: The State of the Art up to 1980, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES 306 (1982); Beyer, Accuracy of Self-Evaluations, supra note 119; Beyer & 
Bowden, Gender Differences in Self-Perceptions, supra note 119. 
 122.  Beyer, Accuracy of Self-Evaluations, supra note 119; Beyer & Bowden, Gender 
Differences in Self-Perceptions, supra note 119.  One study found male overconfidence on 
the typically female task of social skills.  K.V. Petrides & Adrian Furnham, Gender 
Differences in Measured and Self-Estimated Trait Emotional Intelligence, 42 SEX ROLES 
449, 458 (2000). 
 123.  Tomi-Ann Roberts & Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Sex Differences in Reactions to 
Evaluative Feedback, 21 SEX ROLES 725, 741 (1989). 
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However, women engage in far less behavioral self-handicapping, or the 
actual creation of obstacles, and judge such behavior more harshly in 
others. 
2. Risk-Perception 
Higher levels of male risk-taking were initially attributed to greater 
male preference for risk.  However, risk-taking is a function of both risk 
assessment and risk preferences, and recent studies find that a considerable 
amount of the difference in risk-taking occurs because females rate risk 
levels higher than males.124  The magnitude of the sex difference may vary 
with the context, but the overall pattern of difference seems strong.  
Unfortunately, relatively few studies examine which of the two approaches 
leads to more accurate assessment of risk: Do men underestimate risk more 
than women overestimate it?  Some evidence suggests that males are better 
forecasters of risks that do not involve self-assessment,125 while women are 
better at forecasting the extent to which they can control risk.126 
E. SUMMARY 
At the present time, men and women exhibit significant differences in 
personality.  To some extent those differences are consistent with the 
assertion that men are more competitive than women.  Men indeed seem far 
more likely than women to enjoy competition as an end in itself.  However, 
research does not support the view that competition is highly correlated 
with motivation and ambition.  Women respond strongly to individualistic 
incentives.  On average, women are more self-disciplined and 
conscientious than men, and are more likely to be motivated by the intrinsic 
value of a task.  The normative value sometimes assigned to traits more 
often found in men may also be debated.  Men are in fact more confident 
than women, and in part for this reason, are more inclined to take risks.  
However, their self-estimates are often contradicted by evidence, and the 
wisdom of the risks undertaken because of excessive self-confidence may 
be questioned. 
Conversely, women have no monopoly on social virtue.  On average, 
women are more willing than men to sacrifice their own interests to reduce 
inequality.  Women are also more trustworthy in the sense that they 
reciprocate acts of kindness.  Men, however, are more trusting and more 
willing to make sacrifices that increase overall social well-being but do not 
 
 124.  Loretta M. Hillier & Barbara Morrongiello, Age and Gender Differences in School-
Age Children’s Appraisals of Injury Risk, 23 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 229, 235 (1998). 
 125.  Donald Vandegrift & Paul Brown, Gender Differences in the Use of High-Variance 
Strategies in Tournament Competition, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 834, 843–44 (2005). 
 126.  Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, 
and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 288–89 (2001).  For evidence of the 
general connection between overconfidence and excess trading, see Meir Statman et al., 
Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 1531 (2006). 
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decrease inequality.  One sex difference is ambiguous in its normative 
implications: women are more likely to respond negatively to an act that 
hurts them.  The social value of retribution is much debated: my own view 
is that it is sometimes destructive but sometimes a necessary evil that 
increases social cohesion. 
Last but not least, we must try to resist the temptation that many of us 
feel to bend the results to various agendas.  For example, though I find 
myself inclined to regard male overconfidence in a negative light, research 
consistently shows that depressed individuals have a far more realistic self-
image that non-depressed individuals, and irrational self-confidence seems 
to have distinct mental health advantages.127  Confronted with evidence of 
each other’s tastes, both men and women are likely to feel some 
impatience.  Men may feel that women need to toughen up and stop being 
so sensitive.  Women may find men’s antics childish, and wonder why they 
need competition as a substitute for self-discipline.  Both, I hope, will 
suppress these impulses.  Neither set of motivational mechanisms is 
inherently better than the other, and both should be accepted with a 
minimum of judgment. 
III. PERSONALITY IN WORK CULTURES 
Just as personality traits cannot be arrayed along a single dimension, 
neither can work cultures.  Employers can invest their work cultures with a 
wide variety of attributes that will have different effects on workers with 
different personalities and thus different effects on the average man and the 
average woman.  No single work culture is uniquely optimal for inducing 
high performance and the personnel literature reinforces a central message 
of the previous section: competition as such is not a critical element of all 
successful work cultures.  
A. PERSONNEL ECONOMICS 
The central problem of personnel management is the inability of firms 
to observe perfectly either how hard employees work or their basic 
abilities.128  Employers have two ways to address the problem of imperfect 
information: They can invest in evaluating worker performance or they can 
create incentives for effort by performance compensation such as the 
commissions at issue in Sears.  The best combination of monitoring and 
incentives varies with the characteristics of the employee, and if those 
characteristics vary statistically by sex then the ideal employer policy will 
not be the same for the average woman and the average man. 
 
 127.  Peter M. Lewinsohn et al., Social Competence and Depression: The Role of Illusory 
Self-Perceptions, 89 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 203, 210, 212 (1980). 
 128.  Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780 (1972). 
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1. Monitoring Versus Incentives 
Supervisors can observe a certain amount of information about 
employee performance without any special expenditure.  Investing in 
personnel methods can improve the quality of performance information, 
although the cost of obtaining perfect information is generally prohibitive.  
Monitoring allows the employer to discharge poor workers,129 and an 
employer that expends little effort to obtain information runs the risk of 
attracting workers who shirk.130 
Most employers will therefore attempt to improve their information 
about workers through performance evaluation.  With perfect agreement 
between employee and employer, an employment relationship based on 
performance evaluation can be satisfactory to both parties.  However, the 
difficulty of accurate performance measurement may lead to 
disagreements, leading the employment relationship to break down.131  
Employees who feel unappreciated may become demoralized and resentful, 
leading them to reduce their productivity or quit and thus destroying any 
employer investment in their training.  
Even with initially diverging views, performance evaluation may be 
useful if employers and employees each change their assessment of the 
employee’s performance after hearing input from the other side.132  In real 
workplaces, mutual improvements in assessment are an important goal of 
employment evaluations, which are intended not only to reward past 
performance but to improve future performance.  However, employer and 
employee evaluations will tend to converge only if worker self-assessments 
are not systematically biased and workers update those assessments based 
on employer input. 
To avoid the problem of disagreement, employers may choose a 
relatively objective measure of performance such as sales, and use that 
measure as the basis of incentive compensation.  Incentive contracts can be 
classified as individualistic or relative.  Individualistic incentive contracts 
are based solely on the output of the individual worker and include sales 
 
 129.  Although monitoring and discharge are obviously options, the principal agency 
literature has typically treated compensation as the principal incentive mechanism available 
to the employer and monitoring mechanisms have not received the attention they deserve.  
Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency Problems, 82 J. 
ECON. THEORY 293, 293–94 (1998). 
 130.  This parallels the important observation of Edward Lazear that hawks will not self-
sort away from dove firms but doves will self-sort away from hawk firms.  Edward P. 
Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561, 571 (1989). 
 131.  W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Implicit Contracts, Incentive 
Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment, 57 ECONOMETRICA 447, 448 (1989); Clive 
Bull, The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. ECON. 147, 156–57 
(1987).  For present purposes, it is not important whether the relationship breaks down by a 
lawsuit, a quit or discharge, or by failure of cooperation in an ongoing relationship. 
 132.  The formal models of personnel economics have not to date examined this 
possibility. 
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commissions and piece rates, in which workers are paid a fixed amount for 
each piece of output they produce.133  A relative compensation scheme, 
sometimes called a competitive scheme, bases wages on performance in 
comparison to other workers.134  In real world employment, relative 
compensation schemes are especially common in the promotion rather than 
the pure compensation setting: Job hierarchies may be arranged so that a 
group of employees knows that only one winner can be promoted to the 
next level. 
All incentive schemes improve effort, but they inefficiently shift the 
risks of production away from risk-averse firms and towards risk-averse 
workers who require a risk premium in the form of higher wages.135  
Relative compensation schemes can serve a purpose by screening out 
production risks common to all workers,136 but often production risks can 
be more effectively netted out by using measures such as overall firm 
performance that do not rely on comparisons with other workers.  
Perhaps the most surprising result of the literature on relative 
compensation is that the self-interested worker is motivated only by 
absolute earnings.  Relative earnings are of use only in the information they 
provide to the employer, and competition has no intrinsic motivational 
 
 133.  Alternatively, workers may be paid a rate based on output that increases or declines 
as output rises; they may be required to meet a specified quota; or they may be paid some 
complex combination of these schemes.  If the worker’s only choices are the amount of 
labor to supply and the amount of effort to exert, labor contracts should make use of any 
available information.  Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. 
ECON. 74, 89 (1979) [hereinafter Holmstrom, Observability]. 
 134.  No weight is given to the absolute level of individual output.  Tournaments may 
provide winner-take-all prizes; loser forfeits all sanctions; or some more complicated 
scheme that includes different prizes or sanctions for different relative ranks.  Tournaments 
have a complex effect on the risk borne by workers.  They reduce risk to the extent they 
screen out factors like market conditions outside the control of the worker.  On the other 
hand, tournaments may have a higher variance in payoffs than piece rates schemes, since 
low-ranked players may receive nothing at all.  Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 
BELL J. ECON. 21, 22–23, 26, 40 (1983). 
 135.  Since output levels can be confounded by forces like market conditions outside the 
worker’s control, they are an imperfect measure of worker effort.  In a manufacturing setting 
such risks include machine failure, while in a sales commission setting, an important risk 
would be fluctuation in demand for the product sold.  Given fixed information, the usual 
optimum is a linear combination of fixed salary and piece rates based on all available 
signals of output level and only a second best is possible.  Holmstrom, Observability, supra 
note 133, at 89.  If additional information besides output is available, such as even imperfect 
observation of effort or of production risks, using that information will improve the 
compensation scheme.  Id.  
 136.  Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 842 (1981) (two agents); Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. 
Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, 91 J. POL. ECON. 349, 351 (1983) 
(multiple agents); Nalebuff & Stiglitz, supra note 134, at 23. 
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value.  In the words of Bengt Holmstrom, a founder of modern personnel 
economics, “Competition per se is worthless.”137 
2. Sex Differences 
The relative merits of evaluations and incentive contracts appear to be 
different for the average male and average female worker.  Low-powered 
incentives that use minimal evaluation and performance pay are likely to 
work better for the average woman than for the average man.  Statistically, 
women seem to shirk less than men and to have an edge in 
conscientiousness, intrinsic motivation, self-discipline, and 
trustworthiness.138  Two real world examples of this are the increasingly 
large female advantage in academic achievement and the higher repayment 
rates of female borrowers in microfinance settings.139  Low shirking makes 
low monitoring more attractive.  Low-powered incentives may also appeal 
to the average woman’s preference for lower risk and more egalitarian pay 
schemes.  However, low-powered incentives run the risk of attracting 
workers who shirk.  An employer who prefers a work culture with low-
powered incentives will be tempted to discriminate against male workers, 
and such a culture will be most likely to succeed in jobs whose intrinsic 
characteristics tend to attract women rather than men. 
The importance of agreement suggests that work practices based on 
subjective evaluation are more likely to work with the average woman than 
with the average man.  On average, both men and women tend to be 
overconfident, but men substantially more so.  If supervisory evaluations 
are on average accurate, then those evaluations will diverge more from the 
self-evaluations of male workers than of female workers, and subjective 
evaluations will be less useful in employment contracts with males.140  If 
employees update their self-assessment, then evaluation-based work 
practices may be more suited to female than male workers.  Women’s self 
evaluations are not only more accurate to begin with but are more readily 
and symmetrically updated in response to both positive and negative 
feedback. 
Because output measures are relatively clear, incentive contracts 
reduce disputes about performance, but at the cost of higher than ideal risk-
 
 137.  Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 324 (1982) 
[hereinafter Holmstrom, Teams].  This result is an implication of most of the papers 
discussed in this section: “competition among agents . . . has merit solely as a device to 
extract information optimally.”  Id.  Rank order tournaments that use only relative measures 
of output are useful only when absolute measures are hard to obtain.  Id.  at 334–36. 
 138.  See supra Section II. 
 139.  Bert D’Espallier et al., Women and Repayment in Microfinance: A Global Analysis, 
39 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 758, 769–70 (2011); Duckworth & Seligman, supra note 113, at 
205. 
 140.  This conclusion is complicated by the possibility of bias in subjective ratings.  
However, my purpose in this paper is to examine the problems that would remain even if 
bias of the usual sorts had ended. 
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bearing by employees.141  Men are more likely to dispute evaluations than 
women, making incentive compensation relatively more attractive for male 
than female workers.  Men also tolerate higher levels of risk, even though 
the source of this (risk assessment or preferences) is unclear.  
Some jobs have features that create powerful incentives to use either 
evaluations or incentives regardless of employee characteristics.  For 
example, the value of incentive pay is highest when an employee’s output 
can be readily measured, and sales are among the clearest metrics in the 
modern economy.  However, evaluations or incentives may be 
implemented in many ways, and the preferable form may depend on 
employee characteristics.  Even though women are more risk-averse than 
men, Nordstrom uses incentive commissions.  Yet while commissions are 
the centerpiece of the Sears system, Nordstrom takes considerable pains to 
ensure that employees receive other forms of monitoring and evaluation.  
This additional input reduces the risk that an employee will suffer long-
term career consequences because of chance factors, such as fluctuations in 
traffic during assigned shifts. 
In other jobs where output is less measurable, evaluations will 
necessarily play an important role.  However, evaluations may be 
formulated and delivered to employees in many different ways.  Even if 
workers are biased in their self-evaluation and tend to resist employer 
input, subjective contracts may work if employers behave strategically.  
Employers can compensate for overconfidence by applying a deflation 
factor to self-evaluations and by providing employees with highly negative 
feedback.  The harsh methods employed by Salomon might have been 
rational efforts to deflate the egos of the would-be Masters of the Universe 
drawn to the firm.  But strategic feedback that undervalues performance to 
achieve the desired response in the average man will be taken at face value 
by the average woman, who will consequently be unnecessarily 
discouraged.   
Employee self-evaluations will reflect overconfidence from both sexes 
but more from men.  Any rule that interprets the self-evaluations of men 
and women neutrally will tend to disadvantage women.  Sears’ decision to 
hire women into commission jobs depended in part on self-evaluations, and 
this practice would seem to place women at a disadvantage.  Differences in 
self-evaluation may also contribute to the well-known tendency of women 
to ask for less in negotiations, and a work culture in which workers are 
 
 141.  Employers also bear another cost.  Like all output contracts, individualistic output 
contracts distort behavior towards readily observable tasks and away from less observable 
ones, a phenomenon known as multitasking.  A salesperson may obtain high sales by means 
such as misrepresentation that ultimately hurt the employer.  Bengt Holmstrom & Paul 
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and 
Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 25 (1991); George P. Baker, Incentive Contracts and 
Performance Measurement, 100 J. POL. ECON. 598, 599 (1992). 
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expected to negotiate on their own behalf will tend to disadvantage 
women.142 
B. THE SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL CONTEXT OF WORK 
The austere models of personnel economics assume a rational and 
wholly self-interested individual who is devoid of emotions and social 
preferences, both positive and negative.143  These models provide some 
insight into work culture and how it might be linked to sex differences.  
This analysis, however, also leaves much unexplained.  If competition per 
se serves such a limited purpose, why did Sears place such a high value on 
competitiveness?  Why did Salomon Brothers tolerate and even encourage 
not merely competitiveness but abuse?  Why does Nordstrom invest such 
effort in recognition, praise, mentoring, and mutual encouragement?  
The answer to these questions begins with a distinction that is often 
obscured in ordinary usage, in which the term “competitive” is used almost 
synonymously with “motivated.”  Distinguishing between these two 
constructs is critical to understanding the implications of sex differences 
for work cultures.  Personnel economics provides a starting point for 
understanding this distinction.  Employee performance can often be 
improved through incentive contracts, although these contracts unavoidably 
shift more risk than is desirable to employees.  Improved motivation can be 
obtained solely by individualistic rewards for performance that are not in 
the strict sense competitive since they do not depend on the outcomes of 
others; only relative rewards are truly competitive and these have no 
motivational value to a rational self-interested agent.  Relative 
compensation can serve the informational goal of screening for common 
risk but such screening can often be more effectively accomplished though 
measures that do not require competitive relative compensation.  
If game theorists recognize that “competition per se is worthless”144 to 
a rational profit-maximizing employee, its critical role in male workplaces 
must have a nonfinancial function.  The studies that examine competitive 
behavior indicate that the average man seems to enjoy competition as an 
end in itself even when a piece rate would produce higher payoffs.  In the 
words of Joe Paterno, Penn State’s legendary football coach, “We strive to 
be No. 1.  . . . But win or lose, it is the competition which gives us 
pleasure.”145 
 
 142.  LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE 
GENDER DIVIDE 131, 132, 142 (2003); Fiona Greig, Propensity To Negotiate and Career 
Advancement: Evidence from an Investment Bank that Women Are on a “Slow Elevator,” 
24 NEGOTIATION J. 495, 497 (2008). 
 143.  In principle the implications of social preferences might be modeled, but at the 
moment only more informal analysis is possible. 
 144.  Holmstrom, Teams, supra note 137, at 324. 
 145.  THOMAS A. TUTKO & BILL BRUNS, WINNING IS EVERYTHING AND OTHER AMERICAN 
MYTHS 205 (1976). 
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The average woman, in contrast, avoids competition even when it 
would generate higher payoffs.  In research studies, the taste for 
competition has nothing to do with a taste for work; the alternative to 
competition is not a fixed payment but rather a high-powered piece rate 
incentive.  Competitive situations attract men and repel women because of 
the pure value each places on being ranked higher than someone else. 
The recreational value of competition presumably explains why 
practical jokes like those inflicted on poor Matty are so common in male 
environments.146  Yet competition performs another role.  Competition 
does no more than piece rates to motivate the wholly self-interested 
individual, but it does spur those with a social preference for competition to 
accomplish more.  The recreational and motivational aspects of 
competition are not easy to separate, and may reinforce each other.  
Michael Lewis asks why the Salomon partners tolerated the back row 
hooliganism.  And why, one might also wonder, did they let competition 
escalate into aggression by tolerating traders who threw phones at trainees?  
Perhaps they believed that recreational and motivational competition feed 
on each other, and perhaps there is an element of truth in their belief.  
Obviously not all men require an environment with this level of antagonism 
to perform at high levels: The environment can do much to shape human 
personality.  Yet environmental forces do not operate on a blank slate or 
without cost, and modulating the aggressive tendencies of males is neither 
a simple task nor one with an obvious end point. 
The same competitive environments that improve men’s performance 
do nothing to improve women’s performance.  In impersonal laboratory 
settings, competition does not actually decrease women’s performance, 
leaving an interesting question as to why women avoid such environments 
even when they would be beneficial.  One possibility is that women are 
more inequality-averse than men and dislike the ranking that is inherent in 
competition.  Female avoidance of real-life competitive environments is 
easier to understand.  In these environments, the instrumental competition 
that motivates is often combined seamlessly with recreational aggression 
that the average woman may find unpleasant.  Women are more responsive 
to feedback and more likely to worry that hazing rituals have some real 
significance.  And when horseplay becomes physical, women are far more 
likely than men to feel real anxiety.  
Sears insisted, correctly, that the average man is more competitive than 
the average woman.  From this premise, it proceeded to conclude that 
women are intrinsically uncomfortable with commission sales, an inference 
at odds with the use of significant commissions by Nordstrom.  Women 
were deterred from applying to sales positions at Sears not primarily 
because of the use of commissions, but because the Sears culture 
 
 146.  See supra Section I. 
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encouraged salespeople to see themselves in a contest with other 
salespeople rather than as part of a cooperative venture. 
IV. POLICY TOWARDS DIFFERENCE 
Research clearly indicates that the average man and woman today 
exhibit differences in personality traits.  The appropriate policy response to 
such differences is less clear.  If sex differences are purely a cultural 
artifact, acknowledging differences may have the effect of reinforcing 
them.  This Section outlines the case that sex differences in personality 
have some heritable component, so that differences in ideal work 
environments are likely to persist over time.  To some extent the problem 
of work culture may sort itself out; eventually the labor market will tend to 
produce specialized cultures that serve the needs of different personality 
types, albeit at the cost of less than fully integrated work places.  The most 
critical problem facing public policy is the near-term rigidity of market 
institutions.  Work cultures that evolved in accord with male preferences do 
not provide an atmosphere in which women can flourish, creating a vicious 
circle of lower female achievement.  The goal of public policy should be to 
push employers to experiment with new work cultures, not to create a 
permanent regime to regulate the work environment.  
A. ACCOMMODATION AND STEREOTYPING 
Under Title VII, policy towards the sex differences observed today can 
take two basic forms.147  First, employers might be permitted to choose 
freely among all non-sex-specific practices, regardless of whether those 
practices tend to favor the average male or female.  Second, employers 
might be permitted or required to use gender-conscious practices that, 
though neutral in form, were designed with sex differences in mind.148  
Permissible gender-conscious practices could not be designed to favor men, 
but might attempt either not to favor either sex or to redress the problems 
historically faced by women. 
The choice among these policies towards work cultures depends in part 
on whether observed sex differences have some heritable component.  To 
the extent that current sex differences are the result of discrimination, any 
gender-conscious policy, even one that is formally sex-neutral, may seem 
problematic because of its tendency to preserve the status quo by 
reinforcing stereotypes.  The position of women may best be improved by 
 
 147.  A third option is possible: employers might be permitted to choose any sex-specific 
policy they wanted.  This is prohibited by Title VII, and the wisdom of this prohibition will 
not be reexamined here. 
 148.  Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 73–75 (1995); 
Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 
96 YALE L.J. 914, 939 (1987). 
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reducing discrimination and encouraging women to take nontraditional 
paths149: As discrimination falls, the differences between men and women 
will lessen, and the problem of work culture will solve itself.  However, 
even if sex differences result entirely from discrimination, two 
considerations must be balanced against stereotyping costs.  First, under 
current circumstances, a neutral but male-oriented system will operate to 
women’s disadvantage and if change seems slow, accommodation may be 
worth the risk of some stereotyping.  Second, though female traits may be 
the product of discrimination, they may nonetheless be valuable, and there 
may be a general social interest in encouraging a more androgynous 
culture.  The view that sex differences result primarily from discrimination 
thus points to sex-neutral practices but perhaps ones that are gender-
conscious. 
If, however, sex-differences have a heritable component, no long-run 
policy option is very attractive.  Even after intentional discrimination has 
been eliminated, the average man and the average woman will be most 
comfortable in somewhat different work environments and a single uniform 
culture will serve neither well.  Unregulated markets cannot be counted on 
to provide female-friendly environments: The males who continue to 
dominate high status jobs may, even with the best intentions, fail to 
produce cultures congenial to women, at least for very long time of 
transition.  Yet regulation too has no mechanism for producing desirable 
pluralism.  The law cannot realistically require each firm to provide a 
diverse set of internal work environments to accommodate the average 
member of each sex: Many aspects of work culture are indivisible, and 
each workplace has a certain tone that affects all who work there.  And 
there is simply no way to legislate pluralism between firms.  The law must 
set a single standard, and cannot tell some firms to adopt one kind of policy 
and other firms to adopt another.  The next two sections will argue that the 
evidence supports a role for heritability, and that the resulting difficult 
problems must be faced.  The next two sections will argue that the evidence 
supports a role for heritability, and that the resulting difficult problems 
must be faced. 
B. NATURE AND NURTURE 
Among biologists there is virtually complete agreement that some sex 
differences in personality have both an environmental and a heritable150 
 
 149.  Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1839. 
 150.  “Heritability” is the proportion of observed variation in a population that is 
attributable to genetic variation among individuals.  To say that X “is genetic” implies that it 
is solely genetic in origin, like the fact that humans have opposable thumbs.  To say that X 
“is heritable” more clearly conveys the joint role of genes and environment, as does the 
phrase “has a genetic component.”  The word “biological” is not really equivalent to 
“genetic” or “heritable.”  Any physiological phenomenon can be called biological although 
most are the result of both heritable and environmental forces. 
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basis, though the exact roles of environment and genetics are hard to 
disentangle.151  The literature on this subject is large and expanding rapidly, 
and what follows is a cursory survey. 
1. Physiology 
A large body of evidence, including sibling studies and physiology, 
suggests some genetic basis for personality traits in general152 and for the 
statistical differences observed between men and women.  Significant 
differences have been observed in the physiology of male and female 
brains.  Sexual dimorphism has been found in brain chemistry153 and in the 
amount154 and distribution155 of various types of brain tissue.  The best 
understood mechanism156 of neural sex differentiation occurs around the 
seventh week of fetal development.157  The newly formed testes start to 
secrete testosterone that operates on androgen receptors in some regions of 
the brain to produce both structural and functional sex differences that are 
called “organizational” because they persist regardless of subsequent 
hormone levels.  Further organizational changes from internally produced 
hormones occur during puberty.  Except at such critical periods, temporary 
levels of hormones in the bloodstream generally do not have permanent 
structural effects, but may have activational effects on behavior during the 
time they are present. 
 
 151.  Melissa Hines, Sex-Related Variation in Human Behavior and the Brain, 14 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 448, 448 (2010) [hereinafter Hines, Sex-Related Variation].  Hines’s 
perspective is especially interesting because she is an important researcher and has urged 
caution in drawing inferences that sex differences in behavior have a genetic basis.  
MELISSA HINES, BRAIN GENDER 155–56 (2004). 
 152.  See, e.g., Randy J. Nelson & Brian C. Trainor, Neural Mechanisms of Aggression, 8 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 536, 541–42 (2007); Kai MacDonald & Tina Marie 
MacDonald, The Peptide that Binds: A Systematic Review of Oxytocin and Its Prosocial 
Effects in Humans, 18 HARVARD REV. PSYCHIATRY 1, 2, 4, 8–10 (2010). 
 153.  Kelly P. Cosgrove et al., Evolving Knowledge of Sex Differences in Brain Structure, 
Function, and Chemistry, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 847, 850–52 (2007); Larry Cahill, 
Why Sex Matters for Neuroscience, 7 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 477, 481–82 (2006). 
 154.  Cosgrove et al., supra note 153, at 850–52. 
 155.  Ruben C. Gur et al., Sex Differences in Brain Gray and White Matter in Healthy 
Young Adults: Correlations with Cognitive Performance, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4065, 4067–
69 (1999); Richard J. Haier et al., The Neuroanatomy of General Intelligence: Sex Matters, 
25 NEUROIMAGE 320, 321–26 (2005). 
 156.  Recent research suggests that other genes also contribute to sexual dimorphism.  
Arthur P. Arnold, Sex Chromosomes and Brain Gender, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 
6–7 (2004); Arthur P. Arnold et al., Minireview: Sex Chromosomes and Brain Sexual 
Differentiation, 145 ENDOCRINOLOGY 1057, 1061 (2004); Ian W. Craig et al., The Genetic 
Basis for Sex Differences in Human Behaviour: Role of the Sex Chromosomes, 68 ANNALS 
HUM. GENETICS 269, 269, 280–81 (2004). 
 157.  For excellent recent surveys, see Melissa Hines, Early Androgen Influences on 
Human Neural and Behavioural Development, 84 EARLY HUM. DEV. 805 (2008) 
[hereinafter Hines, Early Androgen Influences]; Hines, Sex-Related Variation, supra note 
151. 
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The circulating hormone levels that have both organizational and 
activational consequences have a significant heritable component, but are 
also influenced by environment.  For instance, feedback from success or 
failure tends to depress testosterone.158  Differences in the levels of positive 
reinforcement given to boys and girls could have activational effects and 
also influence the organizational changes that occur at puberty.  The effect 
of environment on testosterone levels also complicates analysis of the 
activational effects on testosterone, since causal conclusions cannot be 
drawn simply from observation of correlations. 
Levels of prenatal exposure to hormones have been linked to sex-
differentiated behaviors including childhood play and personality 
characteristics such as empathy and aggression.159  The concept of effect 
size is tricky in these contexts, but measured in terms of standard 
deviations these sex differences are much larger than observed differences 
in cognition.160 
2. Cross-Cultural Evidence 
Cross cultural studies show that the degree of sex differences in 
personality traits varies widely among societies.161  Environment thus 
clearly plays a role in sex differences.  However, a surprising piece of 
evidence suggests a role for heredity.  Sex differences in personality traits 
appear to be larger in more affluent egalitarian cultures that provide 
women with opportunities relatively comparable to those of men.162  These 
societies also have greater sexual dimorphism in non-personality traits such 
as height and blood pressure.163  A number of explanations for this have 
been explored, and the most persuasive appears to be the general principle 
that better environments drive up the importance of genetics.  Within poor 
societies, even small differences in each individual’s environment can 
create large variation in individual outcomes.  However, improvements in 
environment presumably have a diminishing marginal effect.  As the 
quality of the average environment rises, variation in environment within 
the society has less effect, and genes become more important in explaining 
all types of interpersonal variation.164 
 
 158.  See, e.g., Sari M. Anders & Neil V. Watson, Social Neuroendocrinology: Effects of 
Social Contexts and Behaviors on Sex Steroids in Humans, 17 HUM. NATURE 212 (2006). 
 159.  Hines, Early Androgen Influences, supra note 157; Hines, Sex-Related Variation, 
supra note 151. 
 160.  Hines, Sex-Related Variation, supra note 151. 
 161.  Schmitt et al., supra note 84; Costa, Jr. et al., Gender Differences, supra note 72. 
 162.  Schmitt et al., supra note 84; Costa, Jr. et al., Gender Differences, supra note 72. 
 163.  Schmitt et al., supra note 84, at 176. 
 164.  Id. at 179–80. 
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3. Evolutionary Psychology 
The field of evolutionary psychology attempts to explain many aspects 
of human behavior, including sex differences, as the product of 
evolutionary pressures.  One school of evolutionary psychology—the Man 
the Hunter approach—argues that men will inevitably dominate the 
workplace.165  Like all evolutionary perspectives on sex roles, it begins 
with the theory of parental investment.166  Parental investment theory is 
grounded on the observation that each sex faces a different set of 
physiological constraints, and postulates that these affect its optimal 
resource allocation.167  Through gestation and lactation, female mammals 
are obligated to make a far greater investment in their offspring than males, 
and parental investment theory infers that males will compete for the scarce 
resource of female reproductive capacity. 168 
The Man the Hunter approach argues that human male competition 
consists primarily of efforts to provide females with resources such as 
food.169  Because of their long dependency, human children require the 
complete long-term attention of their mothers, who must depend on males 
for resource provision.  From this perspective, a male orientation in work 
cultures is simply a consequence of greater male involvement in resource 
production. 
Other scholars have questioned the Man the Hunter paradigm, noting 
that parental investment theory is consistent with an enormous range of 
mating patterns.170  Mate competition may consist of many behaviors, 
including resource provision, but also including killing or dominating 
members of the same sex, mate guarding, and enticing the opposite sex by 
displays of genetic fitness.  Resource provision is actually rather 
uncommon in species like mammals where fertilization occurs internally, 
making paternity relatively uncertain: no male resource provision at all is 
found in ninety-five percent of all mammalian species.171  In the human 
 
 165.  Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View 
of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971 (1995). 
 166.  Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION 
AND THE DESCENT OF MAN, 1871–1971, at 136 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972). 
 167.  Id. at 139–40. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Richard B. Lee & Irven DeVore, Problems in the Study of Hunters and Gatherers, in 
MAN THE HUNTER 3, 11 (Richard B. Lee et al., eds., 1968). 
 170.  A number of evolutionary psychologists have noted both this flexibility and its 
implications for political issues surrounding sex roles.  Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary 
Origins of Patriarchy, 6 HUM. NATURE 1 (1995); Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Sex Bias in Nature 
and in History: A Late 1980s Reexamination of the “Biological Origins” Argument, 33 AM. 
J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25 (1990); J.B. Lancaster, A Feminist and Evolutionary 
Biologist Looks at Women, 34 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (1991).  In the legal 
literature, this point is made in Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical 
Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (1994); Katharine Baker, Biology for Feminists, 
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1999). 
 171.  T.H. CLUTTON BROCK, THE EVOLUTION OF PARENTAL CARE  132 (1991). 
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foraging societies of special interest to evolutionary theory, mothers 
provided about one third of the food supply.172 
Evolutionary psychology thus does not support the view that males will 
inevitably tend to monopolize resource provision through competition.  It is 
consistent with a great deal of flexibility of sex roles between societies.  
Still, it does suggest that sex roles may exhibit certain general tendencies.  
Mate competition implies that males are far more likely than females to 
engage in unprovoked aggression, especially physical aggression.  The 
possibility of pregnancy may tend to make females less trusting of 
strangers.  Thus, the role that women play in resource provision will 
depend not on their interest in resource provision as such but on whether 
the work environment is designed to meet their other personality traits. 
4. Policy 
Any attempt to extract generalizations about sex differences from 
empirical research must be conducted with great care.  Scientific evidence 
suggests that sex differences are complex and subtle and no doubt some of 
the results described in previous Sections will be later revised.  Although 
there is evidence that some sex differences have a heritable component,173 
environment clearly also plays an important role.  Even to the extent that 
robust conclusions can be reached, the temptation to characterize an 
essential male or female nature must be resisted.  Essentialism is 
empirically unfounded, since the evidence supports statistical differences 
only, and may stigmatize individuals who deviate from some supposed 
norm.  Indeed, even statistical generalizations may lead to is-ought 
confusions. 
Just because one sex shows a “natural” tendency towards a trait does 
not mean that trait is immutable or should be encouraged.  On the contrary, 
there are strong arguments in favor of at least some efforts to socialize both 
males and females to be more like each other.  Even heritable traits can be 
environmentally modified, as witnessed by the extraordinary success that 
many societies have had in reducing the violence that characterized early 
social groups.174  Sometimes society chooses to fight natural tendencies, 
sometimes to celebrate them, and sometimes simply to go along with them.  
Modification, however, requires some understanding of the baseline traits 
with which one is working.  Quite apart from the question of sex 
differences, no one method of upbringing works with all children, as any 
parent of even two children can attest.  The same approach will have utterly 
 
 172.  Frank W. Marlowe, The Mating System of Foragers in the Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample, 37 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 282, 290 (2003). 
 173.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 174.  STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS 
DECLINED (2011).  Pinker's argument is developed through the book's over eight hundred 
pages, but a summary can be found in Chapter 1.  Id. at 1–30. 
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different effects on an anxious child and an impulsive one.  Whether we 
choose to allow heritable tendencies to play out or to fight them, we must 
have some sense of what they are and how they work.  
C. THE MARKET FOR WORK CULTURE 
At the moment, work cultures reflect a history of male domination of 
market labor.  However, the past decades have seen increasing numbers of 
women in positions of leadership where they might effect change in work 
cultures, and so it is worth considering whether market forces will tend to 
create the multiplicity of work cultures needed to accommodate both the 
average man and the average woman. 
1. Work Cultures in Perfect Markets 
The production of work cultures by firms and the resulting 
occupational concentration175 by sex depends on many factors.  
a. Internal Cultures in Single-Job Firms 
Many dimensions of culture are by definition collective: a firm cannot 
easily have both a competitive- and a consensus-oriented culture, though it 
can have an intermediate between the two.  Thus, along many dimensions, 
a uniform culture will tend to prevail within individual firms.  With an 
industry more variation is possible.  Individual firms may develop cultures 
that are congenial to specific personalities.176  In securities markets, the 
clientele effect is the tendency of investors with certain needs to purchase 
the stocks of certain boutique firms, and a similar effect draws workers to 
firms whose cultures they find hospitable.  
The implications of these principles can be seen by making some 
simplifying assumptions.  Assume that internal firm work cultures are 
monolithic and indivisible.  There are both males and females with an 
aptitude for each occupation, though in different proportions in each 
occupation.177  The aptitude for each job is binary—you either have it or 
you don’t.  Each firm employs workers in only a single occupation.  The 
traits that determine occupational aptitude are uncorrelated to those that 
 
 175.  In labor economics, the term “occupational segregation” is used to describe how men 
and women are distributed across occupations.  In this setting the term “segregation” is 
purely descriptive and does not imply any particular hypothesis about the cause of 
segregation, such as discrimination.  Outside of labor economics, however, the term 
“segregation” is often understood to imply discrimination or even legal compulsion, and so I 
avoid it here. 
 176.  The economic value of sorting by tastes has been frequently noted by Richard 
Epstein.  See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 60–69 (1992).  Epstein is in my 
view quite correct to insist on the importance of sorting; my views differ from his in our 
characterizations of the nature of sex differences and our expectations about how fast 
markets will adjust to social changes. 
 177.  The evidence for heritable differences in aptitudes is summarized in Deborah M. 
Weiss, The Annoyingly Indeterminate Effects of Sex Differences, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99 
(2010). 
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determine work culture preference.  However, all men work best in work 
culture XY and all women in work culture XX.  
Assume for the moment a so-called frictionless market with perfect 
information and no adjustment costs.  No participant in the market has a 
taste for discrimination and the only forces that tend to produce 
occupational concentration by sex are differences between the average 
members of each sex.  With these assumptions, the market will tend to 
produce fully specialized firms, each with a pure form of work culture XX 
or XY.  But though each firm will employ disproportionately high numbers 
of one sex, the market will be meritocratic.  Most members of each sex will 
be able to find a suitable environment to maximize their earnings 
potential.178  Only where one sex has an extreme comparative advantage in 
the underlying occupation will able individuals of the less-able sex have 
difficulty finding a suitable work culture.179 
With no institutional rigidities, this equilibrium should generally be 
reached even from a discriminatory or at least historically different starting 
point.  Suppose women are initially outside the labor market in household 
production.  When they enter the labor market, they will initially find 
themselves in cultures that do not maximize their potential and they will 
therefore underperform.  Enterprising firms, however, will soon realize that 
cheap labor can be obtained by offering a female-friendly work culture; 
women will perform well in these environments.  Other firms will adopt the 
new culture, bidding up women’s wages, and a meritocratic though not 
fully integrated market equilibrium will be attained.  
b. Team Production 
No real firm has only one type of job, and workers who hold various 
jobs typically function together in work groups or teams.  Within each 
 
 178.  A related argument has recently been made in an interesting article by Jonah Gelbach 
et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 797 (2009).  They note that compensation packages may have both cash and in-kind 
components such as pensions, note that two groups of workers may place different 
valuations on each compensation type, and examine the extent to which these taste 
differences are likely to produce sorting into different firms.  Id. at 808–12.  Suppose that 
firms have a cost advantage in producing the in-kind good, as they do with pensions and 
health insurance.  By providing a mixed compensation package, some fraction of firms can 
attract all workers who value the good at a lower cost than by providing cash only.  The 
remainder of firms will provide cash only packages.  This will lead to complete segregation 
of the two types of workers.  This analysis assumes that workers differ in their consumption 
utility but have identical marginal products across work environments and incentive 
packages.  A work culture analysis assumes identical consumption utility but differences in 
productivity in different environments.  The basic static result is the same in work culture 
and compensation cases.  Differences among workers can make segregation efficient 
without imposing monetary costs on either group of workers or on firms.  Past this point, 
compensation and culture raise some different issues that I will discuss later. 
 179.  This problem will be exacerbated if occupational ability is correlated to work culture 
preferences. 
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work group,180 a firm’s ability to provide different cultures to different job 
classifications is limited by the need for team production.  An office in 
which the top management operates under pressure is likely to be a high 
stress environment for the support staff, and methods for differentiating 
incentives within a job are even more limited.  The more that members of 
each occupation must work together, the less divisible work culture will be.  
This will tend to dampen polarization into extreme work cultures and 
produce cultures that are hybrids of the pure XX and XY types.  Since sex 
differences in work culture preferences are statistical rather than universal, 
a hybrid work culture should reduce within-firm occupational 
concentration by sex.  For instance, some males in occupation A who could 
not function well in a pure XX environment might be able to tolerate a 
hybrid environment induced by combining the cultures of occupation A 
and B.  On the other hand, integration may be purchased at a price: 
everyone has to compromise and no one gets the work culture that they 
value most highly. 
Firms may have some ability to create different work cultures for 
various jobs within work groups by different work rules and by different 
incentive structures.  Such techniques will produce a result that is 
intermediate between the team production case and the single job case: 
each job will have more work culture specialization and more occupational 
concentration by sex.  Again, there is a trade-off between catering to the 
preferences of each group and occupational integration. 
c. Multiple Internal Cultures 
Even within a given occupation, it is possible to imagine a firm giving 
employees a few choices.  For example, Sears might have given sales 
personnel the choice between straight salary and a riskier but higher mean 
commission scheme.  The ability to tailor culture within jobs should create 
a mosaic of specialized work cultures within the job and decrease 
concentration by sex within the job, the firm, and the industry.181  Such 
fine-tuning may be the only way around the trade-off between occupational 
concentration and providing each group with its preferred work culture.  
Whether firms can realistically give employees such choices is a more 
difficult and as yet unanswered question. 
 
 180.  Different work groups might have different cultures so that jobs in the front office 
may feel different from those in the loading dock. 
 181.  Work culture and compensation cases raise slightly different divisibility problems, 
and compensation appears to be far more divisible than work culture.  Often there seems to 
be no reason why firms cannot offer both a cash and a mixed compensation package, and 
indeed such choices have been increasing as shown by the trend away from traditional 
pensions and towards 401(k)s.  In a few cases though, the firm’s cost advantage requires 
mandatory participation.  Allowing employees to opt out of health coverage would create 
the same adverse selection found in the private insurance market, and adverse selection may 
explain the trend away from firms offering annuity options in pension plans. 
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D. POLICY 
A frictionless market will tend to produce work cultures that are 
occupationally concentrated by sex at the firm level but less concentrated 
and more meritocratic at the industry level.  The tendency towards 
specialized cultures is partially offset at the firm level by team production 
but at the cost of providing the average member of each sex a less than 
ideal work culture.  This trade-off between firm level concentration by sex 
and accommodating each sex can only be avoided to the extent that firms 
can tailor each worker’s individual environment to that individual’s tastes.  
The exact welfare analysis of this market is complex but on the whole 
there would seem to be no strong case for interference absent the question 
of fairness to women.182  Precisely what such fairness requires is not an 
easy question.  Some might regard de facto sex segregation at the firm level 
as an evil in itself.  However, I would not personally be disturbed by a 
concentration by sex that resulted from individual choice, that did not result 
from the underestimation of female ability, and that tended to enhance 
female achievement by providing environments conducive to success.  
The strongest case for legal interference in work culture rests not on the 
intrinsic value of sex integration but on the history of female exclusion 
from the labor market, especially from the most prestigious positions.  As 
circumstances have changed, women have entered the labor market in 
greater numbers.  In a frictionless market, firms would quickly recognize 
the advantages of providing work cultures congenial to this new pool of 
workers.  Real markets are not frictionless, and various impediments will 
slow the movement of the market towards an equitable equilibrium.  The 
adjustment of the labor market depends on the quality of information that 
firms have about women workers.  Some of this information is gathered by 
observing the performance of female workers.  Yet when women first enter 
the labor market, they must often function in work cultures that have 
developed to motivate males.  Women underperform in such environments, 
thus slowing the revision of rational but inaccurate generalizations about 
female potential.  The persistent conflation of competitiveness with 
motivation testifies to how hard male norms are to revise.  Historical 
 
 182.  Quite apart from the issue of sex equality, some people will have personalities that 
are out of sync with their talents: A mathematician who enjoys pro wrestling and monster 
trucks may feel permanently out of place at work. Welfarist ethical theories may support 
some compensation for inconvenient tastes.  See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is 
Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, 
What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).  The 
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics suggests that redistribution may be better left to the 
tax system, but the analysis of this proposition has turned out to be far more complex than it 
first appeared and redistribution through interference in labor markets cannot be ruled out. 
Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More 
Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUDIES 797 (2000).  Thus, a case might be made for 
encouraging work cultures that are less specialized than what the market would produce. 
Nonetheless, such tinkering seems unlikely to do much good. 
WEISS 4.05.13 1512 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  6:05 PM 
Summer 2013] ALL WORK CULTURES DISCRIMINATE 287 
circumstances can create a vicious circle.  Even employers without any 
animus, using sophisticated updating strategies, correctly observe that 
women perform worse than men and therefore statistically discriminate 
against them.  This discrimination in turn discourages women from 
acquiring relevant skills, perpetuating a true generalization about ability 
and leaving the market in a stable but inefficient equilibrium.  The vicious 
circle problem has been extensively analyzed in the somewhat simpler 
context of pure human capital acquisition, without the complication of 
work culture.183  The phenomenon of work culture would seem to 
exacerbate this problem, since the viability of new work cultures requires a 
critical mass of qualified workers. 
The adjustment of market work cultures is further slowed by the 
generally poor dissemination of information in the labor market.  Workers 
are less fungible than commodities like capital, and so the information 
requirements of the labor market are unusually high.  At the same time, as 
Cynthia Estlund has recently pointed out, legal disclosure mandates are 
relatively rare in the labor market.184  Neither workers nor competitors have 
a good idea of what is going on in any given firm.  This impedes the sorting 
of workers by firm culture and the diffusion of information about 
innovations in firm cultures.  Contractual anomalies such as the at-will rule 
further blunt employer incentives to collect information about worker 
performance.185  Without good information, employers have limited ability 
to modify their workplaces to improve worker performance. 
If work cultures are relatively slow to evolve, the legal system might 
do well to prod them in some way.  Yet this brings us back to the 
conundrum that opened this section: the ultimate goal of policy is a world 
with multiple cultures that provides environments where all can flourish.  
But pluralism is hard to legislate: The law must set one standard for all.  
The next section will examine whether any legal rules might nonetheless 
hasten the evolution of work culture. 
V. THE LAW GOVERNING WORK CULTURE 
Work cultures intended to keep out women are surely prohibited by 
Title VII, but what of those that disadvantage women not by design but by 
historical accident?  This section suggests that legal intervention in male-
oriented work culture is worth considering, but that it is best confined to 
 
 183.  Amy Farmer & Dek Terrell, Discrimination, Bayesian Updating of Employer Beliefs 
and Human Capital Accumulation, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 204 (1996); George J. Mailath et al., 
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 46 (2000); Lawrence E. Blume, Learning and Statistical Discrimination, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 118 (2005). 
 184.  Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 351 (2011). 
 185.  Deborah M. Weiss,  Discrimination and Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas 
 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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extreme behavior that might also be regulated on grounds unrelated to its 
effect on women.  Plaintiffs might also indirectly challenge such cultures 
by a new approach to the lack of interest defense.  Rather than denying the 
existence of sex differences, plaintiffs might instead question whether sex 
differences take the particular form asserted by defendants.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano has the potential to 
interfere with voluntary employer efforts to devise work cultures that are 
congenial to women, and this section proposes a modified affirmative 
action defense that would permit desirable innovation. 
A. WHAT MUST EMPLOYERS DO? 
1. Two Theories 
Employer obligations under Title VII are governed by two theories of 
recovery, disparate treatment and disparate impact.  Disparate treatment 
liability requires a showing of intent to discriminate, while disparate impact 
does not.186  Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment is virtually 
absolute and intentional sex discrimination is permitted only if it falls under 
one of a few specified exceptions, all of which are carefully circumscribed.  
In contrast, the plaintiff in a disparate impact case does not claim that 
the employer discriminated intentionally but rather that one of defendant’s 
employment practices had a disparately negative effect on members of the 
protected class.187  This claim is typically supported by statistical evidence 
of the effects of the practice on the protected group and others.  If the 
plaintiff succeeds in showing a disparate effect, the defendant has the 
opportunity to provide evidence that the practice is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.188 
 
 186. (a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.  
Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 703(a) (1964) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).  Disparate impact theory has been partly codified by later 
legislation, though in an unsystematic way.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).   
 187.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006).  
 188.  Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  This section, added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, does 
not set out standards for business necessity and job-relatedness, but rather selectively 
incorporates by reference parts of the previous case law.  137 CONG. REC. 28622 (1991). 
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The line between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories is 
less clear than it might first appear.189  I next examine a few policy 
considerations common to both. 
2. Targeted Conduct 
Judicial micromanagement of firm culture would be ill-advised.  Courts 
lack the institutional competence to serve as managers.190  Certain aspects 
of work culture are entwined with voluntary social behavior, and detailed 
oversight would impinge unacceptably on associational freedoms.191  
Close supervision of work culture is especially undesirable if sex 
differences have a heritable component, so that both men and women are 
best served by a diverse menu of specialized work cultures.  Both disparate 
impact and disparate treatment must impose a uniform standard on all 
firms.  They might require that work cultures adopt an androgynous 
compromise between the needs of men and women; they might require 
choice in divisible components of work culture; or they might require 
cultures with a female bias.  The one thing the law cannot do is to require 
certain firms to provide female cultures and others to provide male 
cultures, and yet this is what seems desirable in the long run. 
The limits of our current knowledge about sex differences also suggest 
caution in devising gender-conscious policies.  More open discussion of 
statistical sex differences is critical to further progress for women in the 
workplace.  However, these differences are complex and incompletely 
understood.  Liability based on evidence of sex differences crystallizes in a 
legal precedent a particular view of these differences.  This view may be 
difficult to dislodge as scientific evidence evolves.  Even if the scientific 
community reaches a relatively stable consensus on some point, the 
courtroom has not proven to be an ideal setting to convey the state of 
scientific research, and research findings may end up in legal opinions in an 
overgeneralized form that reinforces undesirable stereotypes.192 
For all these reasons, a firm’s compensation policies, its competitive 
tone, and most other features of work culture should generally be immune 
from direct regulation.  In one area, however, some intervention deserves 
consideration.  Men no less than women deserve a workplace that helps 
them realize their potential, and their preferred environment may seem 
harsh by female standards.  However, human preferences are neither fixed 
nor deserving of complete deference.193  A useful perspective on 
 
 189.  George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested 
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2313 (2005) [hereinafter Rutherglen, 
Essentially Contested Concept of Equality]. 
 190.  Green, supra note 4, at 676. 
 191.  Id. at 631. 
 192.  A similar concern has been expressed by Tristan Green.  See id. at 672–74. 
 193.  Some feminists may be uncomfortable with a discrimination policy that embodies 
values beyond respect for individual choice, but  Kimberly Yuracko has convincingly 
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malleability can be gained by a quick survey of the history of violence, 
which indicates that modern society has done a remarkable job of 
suppressing some of our aggressive impulses.194  No simple formula can 
determine the optimal level of workplace aggression, but there is little 
support today for allowing the physical violence and intimidation that is at 
issue in a surprising number of cases.  The average man may always thrive 
in more adversary environments than the average women, but the 
physically aggressive work cultures that are problematic for women are 
also more generally socially undesirable. 
Improvements to work culture may need to begin long before young 
people enter the labor market.  Socialization of both sexes towards—
though not necessarily to—an androgynous norm would reduce conflicts in 
the workplace.  Ironically such socialization may best be achieved through 
sex-segregated education.  Girls may need gentle encouragement to 
become more competitive,195 while boys may best be civilized in an 
environment that meets their needs for aggression.  
But even adults can be channeled towards desired behavior, and the 
regulation of work culture may be part of this process.  Intimidating 
Socratic interrogation and compensation by commission may be useful 
tools for managing men, but when equal opportunity abuse includes 
physical attacks and intimidation196 the law may wish to place a ceiling on 
the acceptable level of workplace aggression. 
Liability at the margins for extreme conduct will not cause immediate 
and widespread changes in other aspects of work culture but perhaps it 
does not have to.  Even circumscribed liability may prompt a few firms to 
consider more general modifications to their culture, and a few successful 
models may provide a catalyst for others to adopt policies more congenial 
 
argued that feminists cannot successfully develop their case independent of a conception of 
social value.  KIMBERLY YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST VALUES 
(2003).  In her words, “feminists’ arguments are driven by perfectionism, not neutral 
principles.”  Id. at 5.  
 194.  See ERIC ARTHUR JOHNSON & ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE CIVILIZATION OF CRIME: 
VIOLENCE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES (1996); TED ROBERT GURR, 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF CRIME (1989); PINKER, supra note 174. 
 195.  Anson Dorrance  coached the American women's soccer team to its first world title, 
and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill women's soccer team to eighteen 
collegiate championships.  John M. Silva III, Psychological Aspects of Competition: An 
Interview with Anson Dorrance Head Women’s Soccer Coach at The University of North 
Carolina, 11 J. EXCELLENCE 88, 88 (2006).  In an interview, he commented that the “biggest 
concern with the females is they don't naturally compete,” and credited the success of his 
program to fact that “we train them to compete.”  Id. at 97.  To do so, however, he adopts an 
approach quite different from what he would have used with men.  “A part of what 
motivates a man,” he said, “is for the coach to actually scream at him during the game,” 
while the identical approach with a woman athlete “will actually shatter her confidence.”  
Id. at 99.  With female athletes, he concluded, “[Y]ou've got to be overwhelmingly 
positive.”  This difference pervades his coaching process: “We use videotape to show 
women they can play.  With men, we show them they can’t.”  Id. at 100. 
 196.  See supra Section I.  
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to women.  Not all firms will or should adopt these innovations.  The goal 
is not to make all firms female-friendly but to make enough. 
3. Disparate Treatment or Disparate Impact? 
A work culture practice adopted for the conscious purpose of excluding 
one sex would constitute disparate treatment, even if that work culture also 
served some legitimate business purpose.197  Such situations are rare, and 
the facts described in Liar’s Poker and Sears are more typical.  Male-
oriented work cultures typically develop primarily at the times when a 
workplace is populated primarily by males, and they function to regulate 
intra-male relations.  
The issue of practical importance is whether Title VII should reach 
practices that do not target women but that impair the average woman’s 
performance.  Virtually all courts have taken the view that disparate 
treatment doctrine does not bar any work policy or conduct directed even-
handedly to male and female employees.198  Only one circuit court (the 
Ninth, of course) has taken a different approach.  In EEOC v. National 
Education Association (NEA), Alaska, the defendant was a teacher’s 
 
 197.  The statutory text is quite clear: since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, “an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”  Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 
102d Cong. §107 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§2000e-2(m) (2012)).  Gelbach, 
Klick, and Wexler reach a different conclusion, suggesting that “as currently conceived, 
disparate treatment claims seemingly do not prohibit the employer from using group-based 
characteristics . . . to treat individuals similarly in hopes that such treatment will encourage 
applicants from disfavored groups to sort themselves out of a job.”  Gelbach et al., supra 
note 178, at 833.  Their principal support for this is a 1993 opinion by Judge Richard 
Posner, which indeed supports their claim.  EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.3d 233 
(7th Cir. 1993).  However, the years at issue were prior to the Civil Right Act of 1991, and 
as authority Posner cites Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989), which 
does tend to preclude any liability, but is now superseded by statute. 
Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler also argue that employers may use group characteristics to 
discourage the disfavored group in the more specific situation where the discrimination 
takes the form of a benefits or compensation policy. Gelbach et al., supra note 178, at 828.  
In Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation 
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086, 1089–91 (1983), the Supreme Court found in 
violation of Title VII a plan that required sex-differentiated contributions to compensate for 
women’s greater longevity.  See also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 712 (1978) (invalidating a plan that required women to make equal contributions 
but receive lower benefits).  Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler suggest correctly that the effect of 
Norris and Manhart was tacitly to approve a plan that was facially neutral but provided 
higher net benefits to women, and argue that Manhart and Norris “foreclose[] the avenue of 
pursuing passive discrimination claims as disparate treatment in fringe benefits or 
compensation.”  Gelbach et al., supra note 178, at 828.  But in neither Norris nor Manhart 
was there any suggestion that the plan had been instituted with the purpose of discriminating 
against either women or men.  Faced with evidence of intent to discriminate and a neutrally 
framed plan with a discriminatory effect, a court would almost surely find disparate 
treatment. 
 198.  A rare exception to this principle is dress codes. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (2006). 
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union.199  One supervisor, Thomas Harvey, frequently “yelled”200 and 
“screamed”201 at employees in a hostile manner, often without 
provocation.202  On only one occasion did Harvey actually touch an 
employee, grabbing her shoulders and yelling that she should get back to 
her office.203  However, both male and female employees testified that they 
perceived his behavior as physically threatening to themselves or to others.  
He frequently invaded employees’ personal space, sometimes lunging and 
shaking his fist.204  The record is not entirely clear about whether Harvey’s 
conduct was different towards men and women.205  What is clear, however, 
is that their response differed.  One female employee filed a police report 
expressing her concerns about the possibility of assault,206 and many 
witnesses agreed that the women in the office felt “in jeopardy” and 
“physically threatened” most of the time.207  In contrast, although one male 
employee testified that on one occasion Harvey once “scared the hell out 
of” him, men in general were far more comfortable with Harvey’s 
conduct.208   
A difference in Harvey’s conduct towards men and women would 
clearly have constituted disparate treatment.  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
went further.  It had already held that harassment of an explicitly sexual—
in the sense of erotic—nature should be evaluated from the perspective of 
the victim, and that the average woman might be disturbed by sexual 
behavior that did not disturb the average man.209  In NEA, Alaska, it 
extended that holding to non-sexual abusive behavior, holding that even if 
the abuser treats both sexes identically, a different subjective response by 
one sex can give rise to a disparate treatment claim.210 
 
 199.  EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n (NEA), Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2005).  That 
the defendant was a teacher's union is itself a striking fact, since few professions are more 
female dominated than teaching.  
 200.  Id. at 843. 
 201.  Id. at 844. 
 202.  Id. at 843. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  Id. at 846. 
 206.  Id. at 843. 
 207.  Id.  Bhend testified that Harvey’s behavior at her evaluation meeting put her in a 
“state of panic,” that she “felt that [she] was in jeopardy,” and that she felt “physically 
threatened most of the time.”  Id.  Indeed, Bhend went so far as to omit submission of a 
number of her overtime hours because she “was too scared of Mr. Harvey to turn them in to 
him.”  Chamara also testified that Harvey created a general atmosphere of intimidation in 
the workplace that was “like working with a ticking time bomb because you’re sitting by 
and you’re waiting for your turn to be next.”  Jeff Cloutier testified, without prompting, to 
the “general fear of the women at our office.”  Id. at 843–44. 
 208.  Id. at 846. 
 209.  Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 210.  NEA Alaska, 422 F.3d at 845–46.  The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in Davis v. 
California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11399, at 
*6, *8 (9th Cir. June 6, 2012). 
WEISS 4.05.13 1512 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  6:05 PM 
Summer 2013] ALL WORK CULTURES DISCRIMINATE 293 
The Ninth Circuit rule stretches the limit of what can properly be called 
disparate treatment.  A practice that is adopted without discriminatory 
intent and administered with an even albeit abusive hand seems by 
definition not to raise a disparate treatment claim, even if it hurts one sex 
more than the other.  Admittedly, the proper boundaries between disparate 
impact and disparate treatment remain complex and controversial,211 but 
several policy other concerns suggest that disparate impact is a more 
appropriate theory.  Discrimination law reflects not one but several 
different normative principles.  At its core is the proposition variously 
known as formal equality or the neutrality principle: employment decisions 
cannot be made because of the employee’s membership in a protected 
class.212  As George Rutherglen has argued, only the neutrality principle 
commands essentially unanimous support in American society and it is the 
foundation on which the political legitimacy of discrimination law rests.  
The neutrality principle finds its fullest expression in disparate treatment 
doctrine, and disparate impact doctrine can be justified on neutrality 
grounds only to the extent that it is used as a means of smoking out 
intentional discrimination.213  Much of disparate impact law extends 
beyond the neutrality principle to embrace principles of substantive 
equality.  These principles command less consensus than the neutrality 
principle,214 and because violations of them seem less morally 
blameworthy,215 the damages available in disparate impact suits are far less 
extensive than those available in disparate treatment cases.216  Limited 
damages serve pragmatic purposes as well: They reduce the costs of 
 
 211.  Rutherglen, Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, supra note 189, at 2325. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299–1311 (1987) [hereinafter Rutherglen, Disparate 
Impact Under Title VII]. 
 214.  Rutherglen, Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, supra note 189; Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact Under Title VII, supra note 213. 
 215.  David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 
971 (1993); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering 
Compliance and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623, 1647–48 (2007) (liability inappropriate 
for defendants who adopt best practices that prove less than fully effective); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1243–46 (1995) (recommending 
two-tier liability, with limitations on damages when no conscious intent to discriminate 
proved); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 983–84, 1001–02 (2005) (proposing modified disparate impact 
and noting its similarity to Oppenheimer’s proposal); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: 
Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1436–39 (2009).  
 216.  For disparate impact cases, the original provisions of the 1964 Act were retained and 
monetary damages were limited to certain kinds of back pay.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
provided for compensatory and punitive damages against a defendant who engaged in 
“unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because 
of its disparate impact).”  Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong. § 1977A (1991) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(a)(1) (2012)). 
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admitting liability, encourage settlement and actively engage employers in 
the redesign of personnel policies to reduce future discrimination.217  
Liability for neutral but violent work cultures falls outside not only the 
narrow definition of disparate treatment but its broader purposes.  A 
doctrine of discriminatory work culture that embodies a vision of equality 
based on difference will not command the same consensus as one based on 
the neutrality principle.  Placing violations of a difference-based principle 
in the same class as violations of neutrality risks popular and judicial 
support for discrimination law. 
At the same time, disparate impact theory seems well-suited to attack 
physically abusive environments.  A key aim of disparate impact liability is 
to reduce unnecessary obstacles to the success of protected groups,218 and 
carefully limited use of disparate impact doctrine to limit violent work 
cultures seems to further this goal.219  Damage limitations may reduce 
judicial and political resistance to a novel theory, and encourage the 
employer cooperation that is critical when the behavior to be deterred may 
be hard to monitor and prevent.  
Only a small fraction of abusive work cultures can be reached by 
disparate impact doctrine, and for this reason Kerri Lynn Stone has 
advocated regulating abuse at work not by Title VII, but by a sex-neutral 
statute.220  Although she makes a powerful argument that broader sex-
neutral regulation would be useful,221 a narrow Title VII cause of action is 
important to establish that the accommodation of differences is a 
permissible goal of Title VII.  Recent developments in the law threaten to 
limit voluntary employer changes to make work cultures more female-
friendly.222  Even circumscribed disparate impact liability for work cultures 
can be used to establish the legitimacy of actions designed to take into 
account statistical sex differences in personality. 
4. The Lack of Interest Defense and the Relevant Labor Market 
Evidence of sex differences already has a place in the law of disparate 
treatment.  In a systemic disparate treatment suit, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant has a policy, pattern, or practice of discriminating 
 
 217.  Two other provisions further the remedial purpose of the statute.  In both disparate 
impact and disparate treatment cases, courts have broad injunctive powers and prevailing 
parties may obtain attorney’s fees and costs.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, 88th 
Cong. § 706(g) (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(g), (k)). 
 218.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 219.  For proposal to apply disparate impact doctrine to a broader range of masculine work 
cultures, see Case, supra note 148, at 78–95. 
 220.  See generally Kerri Lynn Stone, From Queen Bees and Wannabes to Worker Bees: 
Why Gender Considerations Should Inform the Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 35 (2009). 
 221.  Countervailing reasons to limit the legal system's intrusion into work culture are 
discussed in Section V.A.2. 
 222.  See Section V. 
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against a protected group.223  To do this, plaintiffs almost always224 provide 
statistical evidence that the proportion of a protected class in the 
employer’s workforce is significantly different from the “qualified . . . 
population in the relevant labor market.”225 
The relevant labor market should reflect the set of choices truly 
available to the employer and must include only people who are both 
qualified and interested.226  The relevant market can be defined broadly 
(retail sales personnel generally) or narrowly (those selling a particular line 
of merchandise or those on commission).  Typically the more narrowly 
defined labor market contains a lower proportion of protected class 
members and plaintiffs will argue for a broader definition, claiming that the 
narrow characterization simply perpetuates market-wide discrimination.  
Defendants respond that a broad market definition fails to allow for actual 
differences in the qualifications and interests of men and women.227  Views 
on discrimination and difference thus always lurk in the background when 
choices are made among various labor market definitions.228 
A defendant is said to raise a lack of interest defense if its principal 
challenge to the plaintiff’s statistics focuses on women’s ostensible lack of 
interest in the jobs at issue.  Like most defendants who rely on this theory, 
Sears introduced a wide array of expert witnesses, some of whom provided 
what would now be called “social framework evidence”229 of the different 
preferences of men and women in society as a whole.  A prominent 
feminist historian, Professor Rosalind Rosenberg, testified in support of 
 
 223.  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).  Strictly speaking, 
“pattern or practice” suits are suits brought by the United States government under section 
707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2012).  However, class actions by private plaintiffs 
are for most purposes equivalent to “pattern or practice” suits through the use of class 
actions.  Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).  In these cases, plaintiffs 
usually also provide individual class members who describe their experiences of 
discrimination by the employer.  A plaintiff may prevail through statistics alone if the 
discrepancies are sufficiently extreme.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 
299, 307–08 (1977).  But individual testimony brings “the cold numbers convincingly to 
life.”  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.  The EEOC in Sears failed to introduce such 
evidence, and this omission was one of many errors that doomed its case.  Sears III, 839 
F.2d 302, 310 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 224.  Statistical evidence is not an absolute requirement in systemic disparate treatment 
cases.  Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 225.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 308. 
 226.  See generally RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF 
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 4.3 (2007). 
 227.  Perhaps only actual applicant data, reduced to exclude the unqualified, should be 
used.  This option does not eliminate the problem of background assumptions though.  
Using actual applicant data will eliminate members of the pool with no interest in the job 
but it may exclude some who are interested if the employer’s history of discrimination 
dissuaded members of the protected class from even applying. 
 228.  Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 1677, 1737–39. 
 229.  The concept was first introduced in Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). 
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Sears’ claim that women are uncomfortable with the competitive 
atmosphere of commission selling.230  An expert on polling data examined 
national surveys and polls and concluded than women were less interested 
in jobs with financial risk or involving a high degree of competition among 
salespersons.231  Witnesses for the EEOC countered that the evidence did 
not support the view that significant differences existed between the 
interests and career aspirations of men and women: women’s different 
career paths, they argued, were the result of limited opportunities rather 
than different preferences.232 
Cases in which defendants rely primarily on a lack of interest defense 
were once common233 but have become less so.234  The Sears opinion 
created a furor,235 and subsequent defendants may have decided that raising 
the defense explicitly was imprudent.  The question of lack of interest lives 
on, though somewhat under the radar, in the reports of defense expert 
witnesses on the proper definition of the qualified workforce.236  Plaintiffs 
typically respond that the lack of interest argument promotes stereotypes.237  
The “stereotype promotion” argument has not fared well with courts, which 
typically regard evidence of lack of interest as relevant.238  Plaintiffs might 
do better to acknowledge that statistical sex differences exist while 
challenging the traditional characterization of those differences.  For the 
most part, employers have no obligation to change their work cultures to 
meet the needs of women, but they should be challenged if they claim, as 
Sears did, that they could not do so because their cultures reflect intrinsic 
job characteristics.  The trier of fact may well defer to an employer who 
argues that that changing practices to help women would drastically lower 
the productivity of male workers.  But fact-finders might also conclude that 
 
 230.  Sears II, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 231.  Id.  
 232.  Id. at 1314 nn.61–63.  
 233.  Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1776 (finding 
forty-three published lack of interest cases between 1978 and 1989); Vicki Schultz & 
Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of 
Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 
1095 (1992). 
 234.  Neil Dishman, Defending the Lack of Interest Defense: Why the Title VII Should 
Recognize Differing Job Interests Between the Sexes, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 189, 190 
n.3 (2004) (finding only seven published lack of interest cases between 1991 and 2004). 
 235.  See, e.g., Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1753; 
Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond 
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 297 (1991); 
Haskell & Levinson, supra note 69. 
 236.  Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Dr. 
Margaret Stockdale and Dr. Casey Mulligan on women’s lack of interest in relevant job); 
EEOC v. Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Dr. June O’Neill on 
lack of interest). 
 237.  Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
 238.  Id.; Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 638. 
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this failure to change was part of a larger pattern of intentional 
discrimination or that accommodation costs were not that high.239 
A more nuanced response to the lack of interest defense would improve 
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing, and would also serve purposes perhaps 
even more important.  The limits of our present scientific knowledge as 
well as the unsettled status of scientific evidence in the courts caution 
against the widespread use of disparate impact theory to challenge work 
cultures.  Incremental improvements may produce work cultures congenial 
to women and make legal intervention unnecessary.  But if that does not 
come to pass, a more aggressive use of disparate impact would be helped 
by an established body of evidence and doctrine on sex differences, and 
lack of interest suits today can lay the foundation for this. 
B. VOLUNTARY EMPLOYER ACTS 
Judicial edict cannot be the main mechanism for making workplaces 
more congenial to women.  Ultimately, the voluntary actions of employers 
must be the main engine of change.  Such voluntary efforts, however, 
might be challenged by male workers.  As part of its effort to attract more 
women to commission sales, Sears reduced the proportion of compensation 
attributable to commissions.  Suppose a highly successful male salesperson 
challenged this change as discrimination against men.  On its face, such a 
claim seems absurd, yet at present it stands some chance of succeeding.  
1. Ricci v. DeStefano 
Until recently there was no reason to think that the law would place 
any obstacles in the way of employer efforts to make workplaces friendlier 
to women.  This changed after the 2009 case Ricci v. DeStefano,240 in 
which the Supreme Court considered a decision by the City of New Haven 
not to certify the results of a fire department promotional exam after whites 
and Hispanics passed at a much higher rate than blacks.  After reviewing 
the facts, Justice Kennedy announced what has been called the Ricci 
premise241: “Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions 
would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some 
valid defense.”242  The City of New Haven claimed that its fear of disparate 
impact liability constituted such a defense, and the Supreme Court held that 
such fear could not justify the City’s action unless it had a “strong-basis-in-
evidence.”243 
 
 239.  See Green, supra note 4, at 664 (suggesting a similarly modest role for lack of 
interest doctrine in addressing the problems of work culture). 
 240.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 241.  Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343 
(2009). 
 242.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579. 
 243.  Id.  at 582. 
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The Ricci court refers to the City’s action as “race-conscious,”244 and 
interpreted broadly, the Ricci premise classifies as disparate treatment any 
decision to modify a practice that considers the effect of the practice on a 
protected group.  However, Title VII only prohibits action taken “because 
of” protected status, and action that is “race-conscious” might not be taken 
“because of” race.  Suppose an employer notices that practice has a 
disparate impact and is thus motivated to examine the practice more 
carefully.  Upon closer examination the practice appears flawed wholly 
apart from its disparate impact.  The disparate impact has served as a 
diagnostic tool that motivated the employer to find some more general 
problem with the practice.  The decision to change the practice is thus not 
“because of” race or sex, but because of other problems with the practice.  
Language in the opinion supports this narrower reading.245 
Interpreting the Ricci premise narrowly to apply only when there is 
strict causation expands somewhat the options available to employers.  If 
the City’s search for the cause of the racial disparity uncovered widespread 
cheating, the City would surely have been free, even obligated, to throw out 
the test.  Even in Ricci, closer examination of the test at issue revealed a 
number of flaws from a wholly non-racial perspective.  In making its case, 
the City chose not to emphasize these flaws,246 and so its action was 
susceptible to characterization as purely race-conscious. 
Yet a strict causation requirement in the Ricci premise may not help an 
employer who wishes to voluntarily restructure its work practices to make 
them more congenial to women.  The disparate impact that a competitive 
environment has on women is not diagnostic of a general flaw in such 
environments, which may well be optimal for men.  Statistical sex 
differences imply unavoidable trade-offs, and some forms of restructuring 
intended to help women will hurt men.247  An employer who changes a 
practice to help women will sometimes be acting strictly “because of” sex.  
Sears made it perfectly clear that changes in its commission structure were 
motivated by a desire to increase the number of women in its commission 
sales force, and that admission seems to trigger the Ricci premise. 
 
 244.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 581, 585. 
 245.  “Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a 
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for 
all individuals, regardless of their race.”  Id. at 585. 
 246.  George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons of 
Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 88 (2009).  The City did not even argue that the test was 
invalid, only that it might be found to be invalid.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.  To put it bluntly, 
the City was apparently too proud to admit it might have administered a bad test. 
 247.  Such trade-offs are not unique to changes to allow for sex differences, and at least 
until Ricci, employers had been permitted or even required to make changes that deviated 
from a purely meritocratic ideal.  J. Hoult Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1401  (2003) (citing Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 694 (2001)). 
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To avoid invalidating such changes, those of us sympathetic to 
workplace restructuring may be inclined to see a problem in the Ricci 
premise itself and to propose that it be further limited.  But the Ricci 
premise is not clearly wrong.  Suppose Sears had increased the amount of 
compensation attributable to commissions with the conscious purpose of 
increasing the proportion of males.  Presumably this would constitute 
disparate treatment absent some defense.  If the only difference between a 
pro-male and pro-female change is whose ox is being gored, then both 
cases are properly labeled disparate treatment though only one is a potential 
candidate for some defense. 
But which defense?  I argued earlier that disparate impact doctrine 
should be used only sparingly to attack work cultures that disadvantage 
women.  As a result, employers adopting a female-friendly work culture 
will seldom have a “strong-basis-in-evidence” for expecting liability.  By 
far the most important alternative possible defense is that the challenged 
acts are legitimate affirmative action.  
2. Affirmative Action 
In spirit, Ricci is an affirmative action case.248  The opinion notes the 
importance of safeguarding the rights of workers outside the protected 
class, and affirmative action doctrine is the only part of Title VII law that 
provides a coherent framework for thinking about this problem.  
Doctrinally, however, Ricci is not an affirmative action case.  The issue of 
affirmative action was not raised by the City and the only opinion that 
mentions it (briefly) is Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.249  Affirmative action 
doctrine thus remains intact as a potential defense when employer acts are 
characterized as disparate treatment under the Ricci premise. 
The case law of affirmative action has primarily examined numerical 
goals, although the term “affirmative action” in theory encompasses many 
steps that an employer might voluntarily take to increase the numbers of 
historically underrepresented groups in its workforce.  The last time the 
Supreme Court addressed this issue under Title VII was in the 1987 case 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County.250  Elaborating on 
the earlier United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,251 Johnson upheld the 
employer’s plan on the grounds that it had four characteristics.  First, the 
 
 248.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 249.  Id. Justice Ginsburg’s Ricci dissent simply asserted without analysis that “if the 
voluntary affirmative action at issue in Johnson does not discriminate within the meaning of 
Title VII, neither does an employer’s reasonable effort to comply with Title VII’s disparate-
impact provision by refraining from action of doubtful consistency with business necessity.” 
Id.  On closer examination the explicit application of affirmative action doctrine might have 
helped the City somewhat, but, as the rest of this section will discuss, perhaps not as much 
as Justice Ginsberg implied. 
 250.  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 251.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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plan was “consistent with Title VII’s objective of ‘[breaking] down old 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.’”252  Second, the plan sought to 
remedy a “manifest imbalance” resulting from historical discrimination,253 
although there was no evidence of discrimination on the employer’s part.254  
Third, the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees 
or create an absolute bar to their advancement.255  Fourth, the plan was 
temporary, intended to eliminate imbalance rather than to maintain 
balance.256 
Most work culture changes do not unnecessarily trammel the rights of 
other employees.  They erect no absolute bar to advancement, and under 
both disparate treatment and disparate impact the establishment of work 
culture is, unlike hiring and promotion, generally within an employer’s 
prerogatives.  Few courts would regard a change in Sears commission 
policies as the equivalent of a numerical goal. 
Johnson also requires a “manifest imbalance” in the work force.257  The 
Johnson court emphasized that the discrepancy need not be enough to 
constitute a prima facie statistical case,258 but how much less the 
discrepancy may be is far from clear.  In practice, affirmative action plans 
that have been upheld usually involve discrepancies that are relatively close 
to the prima facie case level.259  Johnson may thus not give employers all 
 
 252.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 195). 
 253.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. See also United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 197 
(“manifest racial imbalance”). 
 254.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. 
 255.  Id. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208). 
 256.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208).  
The affirmative action framework helps explain two otherwise puzzling aspects of the Ricci 
opinion: the critical role played by the City’s decision to discard the test after it was 
administered, and the burden that a second test would have placed on plaintiffs who had 
already invested significant time and money in study.  Neither the timing of the decision nor 
the size of the resulting harm seems relevant to whether the City’s decision constituted 
intentional discrimination.  Both are, however, clearly relevant to affirmative action 
analysis, specifically to whether the employer’s action unnecessarily trammeled the rights of 
other workers.  The Court was evidently incorporating affirmative action reasoning without 
saying so, and clear articulation of this would have sensibly narrowed the practical effect of 
Ricci while protecting the interests of all employees.  Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s 
suggestion, had New Haven asserted an affirmative action defense in Ricci, its actions might 
still have been invalidated because they unnecessarily trammeled the rights of plaintiffs by 
imposing a second set of preparation costs.  I believe that Justice Ginsburg made a serious 
and somewhat uncharacteristic strategic mistake in focusing entirely on the reasons that 
Ricci itself should have come out differently.  The goal of a future narrow interpretation 
would have been better served by a dissent or even a concurrence that focused in more detail 
on affirmative action principles and stressed how they should operate to limit the Ricci 
principles. 
 257.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.  See also United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 197 
(“manifest racial imbalance”). 
 258.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. 
 259.  See, e.g., United States v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 448 F. Supp. 2d 397, 425–26 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); Honadle v. Univ. of Vt. & State Ag. Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 426 (D. Vt. 
1999). 
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that much more latitude than Ricci.260  To be sure, a plaintiff who proves a 
prima facie statistical case can only prevail with either additional proof of 
intent or the absence of job-relatedness, and Johnson permits affirmative 
action when these other two requirements are not met.  Still, the manifest 
imbalance test seems unduly stringent when work culture changes rather 
than numerical goals are at issue. 
A third prong of the Johnson analysis requires that affirmative action 
be temporary,261 a rule that makes some sense for numerical goals, since 
permanent numerical goals clearly contravene the spirit of non-
discrimination.  However, policy considerations suggest that there is no 
reason to make work culture changes temporary and every reason to expect 
that some of them should be permanent.  The inherently lower burden of 
work culture changes on those outside the protected class can be seen as a 
justification for the dilution or abandonment of the Johnson requirements 
that sex-conscious changes be temporary and in response to a manifest 
imbalance.  
Finally, Johnson requires that a plan be “consistent with Title VII’s 
objective of ‘[breaking] down old patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy.’”262  That affirmative action be consistent with the goals of Title 
VII seems fair enough.  That those goals be conceived entirely in terms of 
integration is less clear.  The inclusion of race and sex in the same statute 
may have been unfortunate; in this regard the flexibility of the sliding 
constitutional standard would have been preferable.  Some recognition of 
personality differences in disparate impact theory would give a foothold in 
Title VII to the principle that such differences may be recognized without 
doing unacceptable damage to neutrality principles.  Perhaps it would be 
better to require that any change be consistent with Title VII’s objective of 
achieving a more equitable workplace for women. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since its passage, courts and commentators have typically 
characterized Title VII as requiring no more and no less than the neutral 
treatment of men and women.  Neutrality has much to recommend it as a 
normative principle and for many years the neutrality paradigm served 
women well as a legal strategy.  
A requirement of neutrality, however, might take several forms.  The 
law might permit any neutral employment practice, whether or not it is 
more congenial on average to members of one sex.  Such strong neutrality 
principles tend to perpetuate the male-oriented status quo. 
 
 260.  Unlike Ricci however, a Johnson defense does not require any showing of a possible 
causal relationship between the observed discrepancy and the practice that the employer 
wishes to change. 
 261.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208).   
 262.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 195). 
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Alternatively, the law might limit the range of permissible neutral 
practices, excluding at least some that excessively favor traits typically 
associated with one sex or the other.  This gender-conscious neutrality must 
inevitably rest on some vision of which traits are gendered and how 
persistent sex differences are likely to be.  Central to developing potential 
limits is the study of empirical evidence on differences between men and 
women.  Advocating gender-conscious rules that emphasize the ethic of 
care may invite the response, “Well, then, maybe you belong at home with 
your children.”  The empirical difference model suggests that sex 
differences are not arrayed on a simple continuum of care and competition, 
and that accommodation may require modulation rather than radical 
restructuring of work practices such as commission schemes. 
Translating strong neutrality into a policy agenda is relatively 
straightforward, and much of the appeal of strong neutrality is its simple 
clarity.  Gender-conscious neutrality will look clumsy and complex in 
comparison.  Yet evasion of the issue of sex differences has led to the 
stagnation in Title VII doctrine, as courts rightly observe that strong 
neutrality does not imply the relief requested by plaintiffs.  The quest for 
alternatives to strong neutrality is not an easy one, and must evolve along 
with our changing understanding of statistical sex differences.  The 
development of alternative principles must therefore proceed slowly and 
cautiously, one small step at a time.  In this article I have proposed a few 
such steps: a new response to the lack-of-interest defense; a reform of 
principles of affirmative action as applied to non-numerical actions, and the 
tentative introduction into disparate impact doctrine of evidence of sex 
differences.  Only experience can suggest what might follow after this.  
Perhaps employment law has reached a limit, and the problem of work 
culture can best be addressed by policies outside of employment law.  
Male-friendly work cultures developed in firms founded by men, and 
perhaps female-friendly work cultures will fully flourish only when more 
firms are founded by women. 
 
